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1. Introduction. 
Over the past few years there has been substantive progress in our understanding of 
the semantics of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs).
1 There have also been (quite recently, in 
fact) important steps forward in the analysis of Free Choice Items (FCIs).
2 As is well known, 
a  strong  link  exists  between  these  two  types  of  Polarity  Sensitive  Items  (PSIs).  Robust 
typological considerations point in that direction. According to Haspelmath (1997) roughly 
half of the approximately 150 languages he surveys employ the same morphemes for both 
NP and FC uses of Polarity Sensitive Items (PSIs), English being among them. The other 
half  employs  different  series  for  the  two  uses;  as  is  the  case  in  Romance.  If  for  such 
seemingly  diverse  functions,  the  same  morphemes  are  selected  in  so  many  unrelated 
languages, the link between those functions cannot be accidental. FCIs and NPIs must form 
grammatical  classes  that  while  not  identical  have  a  deep  systematic  relationship  to  one 
another. However, the exact nature of such relationship remains the object of an intense 
debate which hasn’t reached as of yet firm conclusions (see, e.g., Horn 1999 for a critical 
discussion of various positions). Here is, for example, an outstanding puzzle. There are NPIs 
like mai/ever that (together with minimizers and n-words) disallow free-choice uses; and 
there are FCIs like qualunque in Italian that disallow negative polarity uses; in contrast with 
this,    there  are  words  like  any  have  both  NP- and  FC-uses.  How  come?  Let  P1  be  the 
property that characterizes NPIs which disallow FC uses (mai) and P2 the property of FCIs 
that disallow NP uses (qualunque). Such properties must be incompatible: having P1 (being 
an NPI like mai) must entail not having P2 (being a FCI like qualunque). Obviously, then, 
we cannot say that any has both P1 and P2, for such properties are incompatible. We could 
say that any can have either property. This tantamounts to saying that any is ambiguous. But 
as we know from Haspelmath’s survey, roughly one language out two is like English: it has 
PSIs that do double duty. So the equivalent of any is lexically ambiguous in every second 
language. And which other lexical ambiguity works that way? 
The present paper is an attempt to contribute to this ongoing debate with a precise 
hypothesis on the semantics and syntax of NPIs and FCIs. Building on the work quoted 
above, our main claim is that Domain Widening (DW), properly construed, does indeed 
constitute a unifying basis to understand PSIs. It also turns out that DW (through the role it 
plays in the grammar of PS relations) also constitutes an important source of insight on the 
                                      
* Acknowledgements: to be written. 
1  I  have  in  mind,  in  particular,  Kadmon  and  Landman  1993,  Krifka  1995,  Lahiri  1998.  For 
background, see references therein. 
2 See especially Dayal 1998, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, and, for relevant background and 
alternatives, c.f. also references therein.                                                                                                                   3 
relationship  between  pragmatics  and  the  computational  system  of  grammar  and  on  long 
standing puzzles like intervention effects. 
  In the remainder of this introduction, I will flesh out informally the main issues 
surrounding  these  questions  and  discuss  in  what  ways  they  are  of  interest  for  the 
architecture of Universal Grammar.  
  The  DW  hypothesis,  since  first  put  forth  about  a  decade  ago  in  Kadmon  and 
Landman (1993), has been the main semantic insight around which current investigations 
of  PSIs  revolve.  The  intuition  behind  it  is  the  following.  It  is  well  known  that  as  we 
communicate, we select domains of discourse as our subject matter. Non referential DPs 
like every student, a student, some student, etc. are used with such domains in mind. For 
example when we say “some student doesn’t know me” we mean something like “some 
student in D” (or “some studentD”, for short), where D is a set of individuals salient in the 
context  of  use  (e.g.  students  on  this  campus/city/country/etc.).
3  What  Kadmon  and 
Landman propose is that NPIs are indefinites (with a core semantics similar to that of some 
student  or  a  student)  which  contain  an  instruction  to  consider  domains  of  individuals 
broader than what one would otherwise do.  
(1)  a. a/some studentD 
  b. any studentD+ 
  where D  D+ 
If use of a plain indefinite a/some student would have naturally lead to focus on some 
salient domain D (say, the students around here) use of any student invites one to consider a 
set possibly larger than D along some relevant dimension, with the inclusion of cases that 
might have otherwise been considered marginal (say, visiting students, students on leave, or 
what have you). This rather simple idea has the potential for explaining why NPIs like 
being in “negative” environments. Consider a typical contrast: 
(2)   a. *There is any studentD+ (in that building) 
  b. There isn’t any studentD+ (in that building) 
In a positive context, like (2a), widening the domain of an existential leads to a statement 
which is weaker (i.e., less informative) than what we would obtain with a plain indefinite. 
Suppose, for example, that the set of new students is salient and that we would, therefore, 
be thinking of them in uttering “there is a student in that building”. Then, if our utterance is 
in  fact  true,  that  remains  so  for  any  larger  domain  (say,  one  that  contains  new  or  old 
students). So what could be the point of widening the quantificational domain in such a 
case? If you are willing to accept an existential statement over some domain D, you should 
be  ready  to  accept  it  for  any  broader  domain.  Domain  widening  seems  purposeless  in 
positive contexts.  
  Things are very different within the scope of negation. In such a case, consideration 
of  a  broader  domain  leads  to  a  stronger  (and  hence  more  informative)  statement.  For 
example, it may be used to convey, that if you were focusing on new students, not only 
there isn’t anyone of those around; but also old students aren’t around: there simply isn’t 
ANY student (new or old) around. This is a sensible thing to do; in fact, it is a linguistic 
move we know we can make in more than one way (cf. “There wasn’t a single student” or 
“There  weren’t  students  at  all”,  etc.).  So,  we  see  that  DW  provides  us  with  a  natural 
“functional” basis for explaining the contrast in (2).  
                                      
3 A standard reference in this connection is Westertahl (1988)                                                                                                                   4 
  The appeal of this line of explanation can perhaps be appreciated as follows. It had 
been discovered in the 70s that NPIs often like being in contexts which share a certain, 
rather  abstract  property  with  negation  (namely,  Downward  Entailment:  the  capacity  to 
license inferences from sets to subsets: John is not a smoker entails John is not a Muratti 
smoker, etc.). Now we have a simple hypothesis on the communicative function of NPIs 
(namely, DW) which makes us readily see why such items would want to be used in DE 
contexts. Only there they seem to serve a reasonable communicative practice: maximize 
information content with parsimonious use of resources.  
  This insight, of course, has to be turned into a “real” grammatical constraint: how 
does one go from basic “functionalistic” intuitions based on DW to actual grammatical 
conditions, viz. pieces of the computational system (that, say, rule things like (2a) out and 
things  like  (2b)  in)?  There  is  disagreement  on  how  to  accomplish  that.  Kadmon  and 
Landman stipulate a construction specific semantic/pragmatic constraint that limits DW to 
occur only in contexts where it leads to strengthening (in a sense, they try to make it part of 
the lexical meaning of any). Krifka, instead, links DW directly to quantity implicatures. An 
NPI activates alternatives with smaller domains; this triggers an implicature, in accordance 
with  Gricean  principles,  that  the  alternative  selected  is  the  strongest  the  speaker  has 
evidence for. Lahiri proposes instead that the alternatives associated with NPIs play a role 
similar to the one they play in focus semantics (cf. Rooth 1985); more specifically, NPIs 
have has part of their lexical meaning something that resembles the meaning of the focus 
particle even. “Even John drank” indicates that John was the least likely person to drink. An 
indefinite with a widened domain does the same. “There is(n’t) any student” indicates that 
the presence/absence of a student in the widened domain is the least likely possibility to be 
actualized (which can be sustained only in DE contexts).  
  The  key  issue  that  arises  in  this  connection  is:  how  does  the  pragmatics  of 
communication  interact  with  specific  lexical/grammatical  conditions  that  license  the 
presence of certain items in certain structures and not in others? How come pragmatically 
driven  conditions,  which  usually  can  be  overridden,  give  raise  in  the  case  at  hand,  to 
unsanable grammaticality contrasts such as those in (2)? Through PSIs, one can hope to 
learn more on this fundamental question  
  Recently, Kratzer and Shimoyama (2003) have argued that DW may play a role also 
in the analysis of FCIs. They study in particular the German FC indefinite irgendein. One 
of its canonical uses is illustrated in the following example: 
(3) Ich werde irgendein Doktor heiraten. 
       I    will     a whatsoever doctor marry  ‘I will marry any doctor’ 
Intuitively, (3) indicates that I intend to marry a doctor, and that I am not choosy at all as to 
who that might be: any doctor whatsoever is a possible option. Kratzer and Shimoyama 
propose  that  this  too  might  be  an  implicature  triggered  by  DW.  They  argue  that 
strengthening  is  not  the  only  reason  why  one  might  want  to  widen  a  certain  domain. 
Extreme uncertainty and hence reluctance to rule out even the most far fetched possibility 
might be another sensible way to exploit DW. By telling you that the indefinite ranges over 
a wide domain I signal to you my intention not to rule any conceivable option out. Whence 
the  FC  interpretation  that  any  doctor  is  an  option.  This  line  of  reasoning  insightfully 
extends  the  DW  idea  to  FC  uses.  And  it  also  raises  questions  parallel  to  those  we 
encountered in our brief discussion of the grammar of “pure” NPIs. How can pragmatic,                                                                                                                   5 
conversation driven processes determine strict morphosyntactic patterns? And what is the 
relation between two so apparently different uses of DW? 
  Against this general background, there are more specific issues in the grammar of 
FCIs that stand out as particularly controversial and that may play an important role in 
making our understanding move forward. One concerns their relation to modality. FCIs 
seem to be felicitous basically in presence of (certain kinds of) modals; even when such 
modals  are  not  overtly  present,  some  kind  of  modality  seems  to  be  required  to  attain 
interpretability. Take for example the following German example: 
(4) Gestern hat irgendein Student fur dich angerufen  
       Yesterday has a student whatever for you called 
Even though this is clearly an episodic sentence, it indicates that the speaker doesn’t know 
or doesn’t care about the identity of the caller. So (4) requires the presence of a covert 
epistemic  modal  of  some  sort  for  its  interpretation.  Consider,  by  the  same  token,  the 
following typical example of a FC use of English any: 
(5) Yesterday Mary saw any student that wanted to see her 
Sentence (5), like sentence (4), is episodic ( not modalized by anything like an implicit 
generic). Still such a sentence seems to invite counterfactual conclusions: If, say, Joe would 
have fancied to see Mary, she would have seen him; this effect is subtly but robustly more 
there  with  any,  than  with  its  cousin  and  near  synonym  every  (see  Dayal  1998  for 
arguments). Where does this implicit modality come from? Why does it patterns in such 
peculiar ways? 
  A  related  issue  concerns  the  quantificational  force  of  FCIs.  German  irgendein 
appears to be definitely existential. Sentence (2) above indicates my willingness to marry 
one doctor; and sentence (3) indicates that just one student called. In contrast with this FC 
any, as exemplified by sentences like (5), appears to be definitely universal. If one student 
wanted to see Mary and didn’t, sentence (5) would be false.
4 At the same time, even FC any 
(which  is  so  clearly  amenable  to  being  understood  universally)  appears  to  acquire  an 
existential flavor in certain contexts. As Giannakidou (2002) observes, imperatives are one 
such context: 
(6)  To continue push any key 
A sentence like (6) does not, typically, constitute an instruction to push all keys.  
   
  Summing  up,  there  is  host  of  intriguing,  open  questions  surrounding  polarity 
sensitivity. The main ones we intend to pursue are the following: 
(7)  a. Can DW constitute a semantic insight capable of unifying all cases of Polarity 
  Sensitivity (from NPI to FCIs) ? 
  b. Can DW, in particular, explain how come different types of FCIs vary in their 
  quantificational force and in their link to modalities? 
  c. DW based accounts are always pragmatically driven. What can we learn from  
  it on the relation between the computational system and the pragmatics of  
  communication? 
  The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we identify more explicitly 
the pattern of FC constructions in Italian, which will bear out and justify the claim that 
                                      
4 The universal character of English any is argued for more extensively in Dayal (1998). Similar 
arguments have also been developed for FC in Scandinavian by Saeboe (2002).                                                                                                                    6 
there are at least two types of FCIs, an “existential” one and a “universal” one, with distinct 
scope properties. This pattern will provide us a with a rich testing ground for the hypothesis 
to be developed. In sec. 3, we will present some background assumptions on the role of 
implicatures in grammar. In section 4, I discuss NPIs. In section 5 and 6 the two types of 
FCIs,  “existential”  and  “universal”  are  dealt  with.  Section  6  provides  some  tentative 
general conclusions. Formal details are worked out in the Appendix. 
 
2. Some Italian data: Two types of FC items. 
Italian (and, more generally, Romance) turns out to be a good language to address 
the issue of quantificational force of FC elements, for it has two related but clearly different 
such elements. The first is [un N qualunque/qualsiasi], which closely resembles German 
irgendein. The second is [qualunque/qualsiasi N] , which resembles more closely FC any. 
They clearly contrast in quantificational force. Here is a minimal pair: 
(8)   a. ? Sono uscito in strada e mi sono messo a bussare come un matto ad una porta  
qualsiasi con i battenti in legno. 
(I) went out on the street and started knocking like a maniac at a door whatever  
with wooden shutters 
b. Sono uscito in strada e mi son messo a bussare come un matto a qualsiasi porta  
con i battenti in legno.  
(I) went out on the street and started knocking like a madman to whatever door with  
wooden shutter 
Sentence (8a) is somewhat marginal; however, it can be interpreted if we imagine a context 
in which the agent goes out without knowing what to do and acts upon a door selected 
ramdomly; in such a (semi modalized) context, (8a) interpreted existentially: I knocked to 
one  door.  The  modifier  con  i  battenti  in  legno  ‘with  wooden  shutters’  can  readily  be 
construed in a non restrictive manner. Sentence (8b) is understood, instead, universally (I 
knocked to all doors with wooden shutters), and the modifier is construed restrictively. The 
existence  of  different  constructions  (ultimately  involving  different  lexical  items)  with 
different  quantificational  forces  clearly  needs  to  be  understood  better:  If  DW  is 
systematically involved in FCIs, how can it give rise to such diverse effects? 
  Schematically, the form of FCIs in Italian is the following: 
(9)  a. [INDEF  NOUN        FC] 
5 
      un    dolce  qualsiasi/qualunque 
      a    sweet  whatever 
      due    dolci  qualsiasi/qualunque 
                two    sweets whatever 
     ….. 
  b. FC                NOUN 
                                      
5 The order [INDEF  FC  NOUN] is also found: 
(a)  un qualsiasi/qualunque uomo 
        a   whatever      man 
However,  in  such  order,  the  only  possible  realization  for  INDEF  is  the  indefinite  article. 
Numerals are disallowed: 
(b)  * due qualsiasi uomini 
            two whatever men 
I don’t know why this is so.                                                                                                                   7 
        qualunque/qualsiasi dolce 
        whatever     sweet 
The constructions in (9a) vs. (9b) probably are syntactically related. But I won’t attempt 
any serious analysis of their syntactic structure here. From a semantic point of view, such 
constructions have a common core (which we will try to bring out). However, as pointed 
out  above,  they  also  clearly  differ  in  quantificational  force,  with  (9a-b)  interpreted 
existentially  and  (9c)  interpreted  way  more  universally  (if  one  may  say  so).  We  have 
illustrated this for episodic contexts (i.e. (8) above). Under modals, we get a similar pattern 
(with one distinguo, as we will directly see). 
  (10)  i. Future 
    a. Domani interrogherò qualsiasi studente che mi capiterà a tiro     ,   
       tomorrow I will interrogate whatever student that I will lay my eyes on 
    b. Domani interrogherò uno studente qualsiasi          
        tomorrow I will interrogate a student whatever 
  ii. Imperative  
    c. Prendi qualunque dolce               ,   
        Take any sweet 
    d. Prendi un dolce qualunque               
      Take a sweet whatever 
    iii. Modals of possibility 
  c. Puoi prendere qualunque dolce             ,   (?) 
       You can take any sweet 
    d. Puoi prendere un dolce qualunque             
        You can take a whatever sweet 
    iv. Modals of necessity 
  e. Devi prendere qualunque dolce con il liquore          ,   (?) 
       You must take any sweet with liquor 
         [  -favoring context: If you go to Naples, you must go to Scaturchio] 
    f. Devi prendere un dolce qualunque con il liquore          
        You must take a whatever sweet with liquor 
Take  a  sentence  with  [qualsiasi  N]  like  (10a).  It  uncontroversially  admits  a  universal 
reading: (10a) can readily be used to express my intention to see all students. However, 
within the scope of a modal (unlike what happens in episodic contexts such as (8) above), 
[qualsiasi N] also seems to admit of an existential reading. E.g., I can also use (10a) to 
express  my  intention  to  interrogate  just  one  student.  With  some  modalities  (e.g.  with 
imperatives) this ambiguity is very clear. In other cases (e.g. in (10e)) the universal reading 
seems to be favored and a special contexts might be called for in order to get the existential 
reading.  
  So,  there  is  a  sharp  and  systematic  contrast  between  [qualsiasi  N]  and  [un  N 
qualsiasi] structures. The former always admits of a universal reading; however, in the 
scope of an overt modal, it also seems to be able to get an existential reading (at least, often 
enough). The latter is always existential and gets interpreted universally, if at all, in highly 
marked circumstances.  
  From now on, I will reserve “existential FCIs” to the structures in (9a), while I will 
use “universal FCIs’ for those in (9b). These are intended as descriptive labels (without 
prejudging the analysis).                                                                                                                   8 
  Another interesting difference between existential and universal FCIs concerns what 
has come to be known as the “subtrigging” effect,
6 illustrated by the following paradigm. 
(12)  a. ? ? Ieri  ho parlato con un qualsiasi filosofo  
b. ?? Ieri  ho parlato con un qualsiasi filosofo che fosse interessato a parlarmi 
c. ?? Ieri ho parlato con qualsiasi filosofo 
d. Ieri ho parlato con qualsiasi filosofo che fosse interessato a parlarmi 
Sentence (12a), in which the existential FCI appears unmodified, out of the blue is marginal 
(unless we are in special contexts); the addition of a relative clause, if anything, makes 
things worse (12b). Also the universal FCI, when it appears unmodified is marginal (unless 
we are in special contexts); however, the addition of a relative clause makes it completely 
acceptable. A modifier seems to restore full grammaticality for universal FCIs in episodic 
sentences. No similar effect is detectable with existential FCIs. 
  Also telling is the interaction of Italian FCIs with negation, as it reveals further 
scope differences between the two types of FCIs. A sentence like (13), for example, where 
negation  has  scope  over  a  universal  FCI,  typically  is  only  acceptable  with  the  special 
intonation associated with the so called “rethorical” reading.  
(14)   Non leggerò qualunque libro 
  (I) won’t read whatever book 
Sentence (14) says that it is not the case that I will read every book (i.e. ¬  ) and suggests 
that I am going to read some special one. If we add a modifier and make the FCI more 
heavy (i.e., perhaps, more topical), things change. The rethorical “not just any old one” 
reading remains possible. But next to it, a novel one appears: 
(15)   Non leggerò qualunque libro che mi consiglierà Gianni 
  (I) won’t read any book that John will recommend to me 
Sentence (15) can also express that I simply won’t read any book suggested by Gianni (i.e. 
a  ¬ / ¬   reading).  
  So universal FC items, at least in certain cases, display a scopal ambiguity vis-à-vis 
negation. In contrast with this, an existential FCI embedded under negation only has the 
rethorical reading: 
(16)  Non leggerò un libro qualunque (che mi consiglierà Gianni) 
  (I) won’t read a book whatever (that John will recommend to me). 
Sentence (16) can only mean that I won’t read any old book (recommended by Gianni). 
This fact is particularly interesting as it differs from what Kratzer and Shimoyama report on 
German  irgendein  (which  is  otherwise  so  similar  to  Italian  uno  qualunque).  Under 
negation, German irgendein is ambiguous between a rethorical and a non rethorical/NPI-
like  reading  (as  it  happens  with  (15)  in  Italian).  Anyway,  on  top  of  this  interesting 
crosslinguistic  contrast,  we  see  that  in  Italian  universal  and  existential  FCIs  display  a 
differentiated behavior under negation, whose rationale one would like to understand. 
  Thus Italian FCIs form a rather interesting and in certain regards puzzling pattern, 
which  enables  us  to  integrate  the  generalizations  so  far  put  forth  in  the  literature.  In 
particular,  the  existence  (in  fact,  co-existence)  of  two  kinds  of  FCIs  (contrasting  in 
existentiality  vs.  universality)  with  distinct  scopal  properties  seems  to  be  empirically 
supported. The interesting theoretical question is how exactly these two types of FCIs are 
related to each other and to other polarity phenomena.     
                                      
6 This terminology is taken from LeGrand (1975)                                                                                                                   9 
 
3. Background: Pragmatics in Grammar. 
As pointed out in the introduction, the semantically based approaches to Polarity 
Sensitivity we are considering all appeal to pragmatics, in some form or other. The problem 
that arises in this connection is how pragmatic and morphosyntactic processes interact with 
each other in a modular system. With respect to such problem, I will be assuming that 
certain pragmatic processes (i.e. processes involving speaker’s intentions and other aspects 
of the conceptual/intentional system) are visible to (and accessed by) the computational 
system.  More  specifically,  (some)  implicatures  are  computed  recursively  and 
compositionally, on a par with ordinary meaning computation (and aren’t, therefore, part of 
a postgrammatical process). The main motivation for such an assumption, in a nutshell, is 
twofold. First, NPI licensing can occur at any level of embedding. If implicatures play a 
role in such licensing, they must be computed at the relevant embedded site, on a par with 
compositional semantic processes and other cyclic (or phase driven) syntactic processes. 
Second, scalar implicatures play a key role, I claim, in certain grammaticality judgments 
(e.g., those related to so called intervention effects –cf. below sec. 4.3xx); if so, then scalar 
implicature computations must be part of (or accessible to) the computational system of 
UG. 
An early approach to pragmatics along these lines was developed by Gazdar (1979). 
Recently, similar ideas have been revived in work on “maximization” (Landman 1998) and 
other Scalar Implicatures (Chierchia 2004).
7 Some general consequences of these views for 
modern pragmatics are addressed in Recanati (2003). The approach to Polarity Sensitivity 
to be developed here has to rely on frameworks of this sort. For explicitness sake I will now 
outline a compositional system of Scalar Implicature (SI) calculation, as an example of 
“recursive  pragmatics”.  I  will  do  so  in  informal  terms,  leaving  formal  details  to  the 
Appendix. The system I will present is a slight (?) modification of the one developed in 
Chierchia (2004). It should be born in mind that what follows is provided primarily for 
illustrative purposes and can/should be modified in more than one way.  
3.1. Recursive Pragmatics. 
Each  expression  (or  rather,  its  LF  representation)  is  associated  to  its 
meaning/denotation in familiar ways. For example, (17a) is interpreted, say, as in (17b): 
(17)  a.  many of your students complained 
b. || many of your students complained || = manyD (of your students)(complained) 
I use logical formulae as stand ins for the corresponding denotations (cf. Appendix xx). The 
inferential process through which the (canonical scalar) implicature arises, according to the 
familiar Gricean proposals, is often characterized along the following lines: 
8 
  (18)  a. some of your students complained 
      b. many of your students complained 
      c. all of your students complained 
       
    i. The speaker chose to utter (b) over (a) or (c), which would have been also relevant 
                                      
7 A bibliographical remark. The basic ideas in Chierchia (2004) have been first elaborated in 1999 
(and presented at a series of workshops, etc.); a written form essentially identical to the published 
version has been circulating since 2001. 
8 This is, of course, directly inspired by Grice (1989). Cf. also Horn (1989).                                                                                                                   10 
    ii. (c) entails (b), which entails (a) [ the quantifiers form a scale] 
iii. Given that (c) is stronger than (b), if the speaker had the info that (c) holds, she 
would have said so     [quantity] 
    iv. The speaker has no evidence that (c) holds 
    v. The speaker is well informed on the relevant facts 
     Therefore: 
  vi. The speaker has evidence that  is not the case that (c) holds 
Notice that the last step, unlike the previous ones, is not readily justifiable on the basis of 
Grice’s maxims and (pure) logic. It seems to require a “leap of faith” about the information 
state of the speaker. Such a leap, called by Suaerland 2005, the epistemic step, tantamounts 
to a sort of neg-lowering, i.e. pushing negation across an epistemic modal (from not has 
evidence that to has evidence that not). This step is crucial in deriving SIs and will also 
play a key role below in deriving  the implicature characteristic of FCIs. 
  It is evident that the process in (18) does not consciously take place whenever an 
implicature  comes  about.  Rather,  it  seems  to  be  automatic  and  unconscious  in 
hearers/speakers just like so many other aspects of semantic interpretation. This suggests 
that it may be wrong to limit processes of this sort to root sentences. It is true that the 
reasoning in (18) concerns the effects of utterances. But embedded clauses are, after all, 
potential utterances. And surely speakers do routinely work out the possible conversational 
effects of potential utterances. So it is conceivable that we run through a process like (18) 
in  a  cyclic  manner,  computing  the  “utterance  potential”  of  embedded  clauses 
compositionally. I will pursue here this idea, by assuming that there are operations that 
“enrich” basic meanings and freely take place at scope sites. Such operations (together with 
certain assumptions on functional application) constitute the core of recursive pragmatics. 
  A  crucial  part  of (18)  is  the  observation  that  a  sentence  is  typically  considered 
against  the  background  of  a  set  of  alternatives. Once  the  alternative  set  (e.g.  18a-c)  is 
salient to illocutionary agents, choosing a particular sentence out of it is going to be per se 
informative.  Krifka  xx  speaks,  in  this  connection,  of  “motivated  interpretation  of 
alternatives”,  typically  guided  by  the  awareness  that  one  could  have  made  weaker  or 
stronger  assertions.  In  particular,  scalar  items  seem  to  automatically  activate  the 
alternatives  constituted  by  their  scale  mates.  Uttering  (17a)  brings  spontaneously  to 
salience the alternatives in (18a-c). It is as if we compute alternatives in tandem with the 
basic meaning of a scalar item. We can imagine a function || ||
ALT   
that associates with any item its scalar alternatives. For example:  
(19)  || many of your students complained ||
ALT =  
{  someD(of  your  students)(complained),  manyD(of  your  students)(complained), 
everyD (of your students)(complained)} 
Surely  such  a  set  of  alternatives  is  computed  through  the  same  operations  we  use  to 
compute plain meanings. In fact, this can be done just like in alternative semantics for 
questions  (Hamblin  1973)  or  focus  (Rooth  1985,  1992).  And  something  like  (19)  can, 
accordingly,  be  thought  of  as  specifying  one  of  the  questions/issues  under  discussion, 
namely the question “roughly how many of your students complained?” 
  Alternatives keep growing until they are factored into meaning by some operation 
that produces pragmatically enriched interpretations. In the case of scalar alternatives, such 
an  operation  can  be  characterized  rather  simply.  The  alternatives  in  (19)  are  linearly 
ordered by entailment (and hence, informativeness), i.e. they constitute a scale. Against this                                                                                                                   11 
background, the pragmatic reasoning considered above in (18), including the epistemic 
step, yields that the alternative the speaker picks (and its entailments) is the only one s/he 
regards as true. We may spell out the result of enrichment as follows (where ||  ||s is to be 
thought of as (part of) a recursive characterization of the notion of enriched meaning): 
(20)  || many of your students complained ||s =  
a. manyD(of your students)(complained)    
     p p || many of your students complained ||
ALT  p    
      manyD(of your students)(complained)   p 
b. manyD(of your students)(complained)   ¬ allD (of your students)(complained) 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  (20a)  is  equivalent  to  (20b).  The  latter  format  makes  the  scalar 
reinforcement more transparent. The former (namely (20a) makes it evident that scalar 
enrichment tantamounts to adding a silent “only” to the basic meaning (cf. Rooth xx, Fox 
xx). In other words, it is as if scalar items bring to salience a question of the form “roughly 
how many…?” and the sentence winds up being taken as an exhaustive answer to such 
question. 
Putting  all  this  together,  and  adopting  the  abbreviation  in  (21a),  we  can  define 
enrichment as in (21b). 
(21)  a. OC[q] = q    p [[p  C]   p   q   p]  
    (q and its entailment are the only members of C that holds)
9 
b. ||   ||s =  OC [||   ||], where C =  ||  ||
ALT 
  This enrich operation applies freely at, say, scope sites. The parallel with focus  
semantics becomes at this point hard to miss. The only difference is that scalar alternatives 
are lexically driven and not necessarily activated by any special accentual pattern.  
Actually, there is a further difference with focus which makes things more interesting 
(as  it  requires  thinking  of  enrichment  recursively).  Under  embedding,  implicatures  are 
sometimes preserved and sometimes “recalibrated”. Let us see this through an example. 
Consider a sentence like (22a). In principle, it can be enriched in two ways, represented by 
(22b-c) and (22d-e) respectively:  
(22)  a. John believes that many of your students complained 
b. John believes that many of your students complained and it is conceivable for all 
John believes that non all did 
c. OC [believe (j , manyD(of your students)(complained) )] = 
    believe (j ,  manyD(of your students)(complained) ) 
      ¬ believe (j , allD (of your students)(complained) ) 
d. John believes that many, though not all, of your students complained 
e. believe (j ,   OC [ manyD(of your students)(complained)] ) =  
    believe (j ,  manyD(of your students)(complained) ) 
    ¬ allD (of your students)(complained) ) 
   
If you work things out, you’ll see that (22b) (which corresponds to the interpretation (22c), 
i.e. a  
                                      
9 I am going to assume that, for any p, OC(p) is only defined if a suitable set of alternatives (in the 
case at hand, scalar ones) is available.                                                                                                                   12 
root level application of enrichment) is actually rather weak; (22d-e) (which corresponds to 
(22e))  
is considerably stronger (it entails (22b)). I think that (22d), i.e. the one with the embedded 
implicature, is the preferred reading. At any rate, such a reading is certainly there and to 
obtain  it  we  must  countenance  that  believe  applies  to  the  enriched  interpretation  of  its 
complement. I.e. we must countenance an application rule of the following form: 
(23)   ||believe that S||s = ||believe||s(||that S||s)  
You  see  here  the  recursion  taking  shape.  However,  things  change  considerably  if  we 
consider a sentence like (24a). Here the embedded implicature would correspond to (24b-
c); the matrix one to (23d-e) (I am representing doubt as ¬ believe).  
(24)       a. John doubts that many of your students complained 
b. John doubts that many but not all of your students complained 
c.  ¬ believe (j , OALT manyD(of your students)(complained) 
d.  John doesn’t believe that many of your students complained but believes that 
some did. 
e. OC ¬ believe (j , manyD(of your students)(complained) = 
   ¬ believe (j , manyD(of your students)(complained)  
      believe (j , someD(of your students)(complained)   
Sentence  (24a)  hardly  ever  has  an  interpretation  like  (24b);  such  interpretation  is  only 
available in  
special contexts (and with the help of appropriate stress on many); more normally, if (24a)  
implicates anything, it implicates something like (24d). Here, the original (embedded)  
implicature disappears. And a new one surfaces.
 10  
  In  comparing  (22)  with  (24),  readers  will  immediately  realize  that  the  factor 
responsible  for  this  pattern  must  be  the  monotonicity  properties  of  doubt,  which  is  a 
downward entailing (DE) function (more or less assimilable to “not believing”). Roughly 
speaking, (canonical) implicatures (like those from many to many but not all) may well be 
preserved  under  embedding  within  non  DE  (i.e.  non  “negation  like”)  functions;  while 
typically they are recalibrated when embedded in DE functors (a generalization we shall 
refine shortly). This means that the semantics we use to compute the strong meaning in 
cases like (24) is: 
(25)  ||doubt that S||s = OC ||doubt||(||that S||) 
So, putting (23) and (25) together, we get something like: 
      || ||s (|| || s), if   is not DE 
(26)   ||   ||s =  
OC || ||(|| ||), otherwise
11 
                                      
10 The observation that negation affects implicature computation was already made in Gazdar 
(1979). Horn (xx) generalized Gazdar’s observation to all DE contexts. For relevant discussion, cf. 
also Levinson (2000). 
11 Actually,  since OC || ||(|| ||), is only defined if   contains a scalar term. So the following 
definition is more precise (or more pedantic, as the case may be): 
      || ||s (|| ||s), if   is not DE  
||[    ]||s
 =   || ||s (|| ||), if || || is DE and   contains no scalar term                                                                                                                   13 
While this implementation is open to the allegation of being ad hoc, and one can surely try 
to  
improve on it, behind it there is a rather neat generalization: 
(27)   In enriching a meaning, accord preference to the strongest option  
(if there is nothing in the context/common ground that prevents it) 
  This principle predicts the preference for the embedded enrichment in (22) and for the root  
one in (24), which seems prima facie in line with intuitions and, if true, vividly exposes the 
“spontaneous logicality” of language. In adding SIs, speakers seek to optimize information 
content (= logical strength) in a way that keeps track of the effect of entailment reversing 
contexts (like the DE ones).  
  Notice that this reasoning can apply iteratively (i.e. recursively). So, for example, 
we can embed a sentence like (24a) further. And if the embedding function is not DE, then 
we can well get an embedded implicature: 
(28)  a. I am sure that John doubts that many of your students complained 
b. I am sure that John disbelieves that many of your students complains but he believes 
that  
some did.
12 
  It is not hard to imagine a situation in which one would utter say (28a) with the intention of  
conveying something like  (28b).   
So,  in  a  compositional  characterization  of  the  notion  of  enriched  meaning,  the 
switch from (22) to (23) can be obtained by a “clever” definition of functional application. 
If the function is not DE, we use simple functional application (which leads to embedded 
impicatures). But the streongthened meaning of the argument should be preserved as such 
only if its stengthening doesn’t lead to its contrary; which will inexorably happen if the 
function is DE. In the latter case, the implicature must be recalibrated, i.e. locally adjusted 
.This gives an idea of how the pragmatics of scalar implicatures may be set up recursively. 
To complete the picture, we need to say something about multiple scales and implicatures 
embedded in the wrong place, as it were. We do this in the following two subsections.
13 
   
3.2. Multiple scales. 
    Often enough, one finds more than one scalar item in the same sentence: 
  (26)   a. Someone smokes or drinks 
    b. Someone (though not everyone) smoke or drink (but not both) 
The strong meaning of (26a) is something like (26b). How can we obtain it? And how do 
we keep track of multiple scales? The simplest way to go seems to me to have multiple 
                                                                                                                         
OC || ||s (|| ||), where C is || ||(|| ||)’s scale in  || ||(|| ||
ALT) , otherwise 
 
12 For unclear reasons, the implicature in (28b) is stronger for examples like. 
(a) I am sure that John doubts that all of your students complained 
But this does not affect our main point 
13  “Globalistic”  alternatives  to  this  view  can  be  found  in  Sauerland  xx  and  Spector  xx.  See 
Chierchia (2004) for arguments against globalism. I should, however, add that it is technically 
feasible to adopt the algorithms proposed by Sauerland or Spector and used them in a cyclic 
manner, along the lines suggested here.                                                                                                                   14 
cyclic application of enrichment at clausal nodes. So assuming a LF like (27a) for (26a), we 
want  something like (27b) as its strong meaning. 
(27)  a. Someonei [ti smoke or ti drinks] 
  b. O [some (one)  xi O [smoke(xi)   drink(xi)] 
Now, if we consider both the scales of some and or as part of the same set of alternatives to 
(27a) we get the following picture: 
(28)  Someonei [ti smoke or ti drinks] 
 
 
      Someonei [ti smoke and ti drinks]    everyonei [ti smoke or ti drinks] 
 
          Everyonei [ti smoke and ti drinks] 
The spatial arrangement and arrows  indicates the entailment relations. What happens then 
is that if we try to compute the implicature at the root level in sentences like (27a), we 
won’t find a unique scale among the alternatives activated by the lexical entries. A natural 
stipulation to make in this connection is that in such a situation we wouldn’t know which 
scale to pick; and hence we wouldn’t know how to strengthen. On the other hand, if we 
apply strengthening cyclically, handling implicature triggers in the order in which they are 
introduced (as in (27b)), each time we deal with a unique scale, which simplifies things 
greatly. As this seems natural enough, I will adopt it: 
(29)  a. To strengthen via O, the scale must be uniquely determined 
  b. || ||s = OC(|| ||), where C is  ’s scale in || ||
ALT 
If there is more than one scale for   in ALT, the definite description “ ’s scale in || ||
ALT” 
fails  to  be  proper  and  consequently  strengthening  fails.  This  forces  us  to  choose  the 
strengthening represented in (27b), a welcome result. For this to work, we also need of 
course to assume that whenever we use O, the relevant alternatives are “used up”. In other 
words, the alternatives to, say, [ti smoke or ti drinks] differ depending on whether it is 
interpreted “plainly” (i.e. in terms of its unenriched meaning) or “scalarly” (i.e. in terms of 
its enriched meaning). So we must set up our definition of alternatives as follows:  
(30)  ||[ti smoke or ti drinks]||
ALT = { smoke(xi)   drink(xi), smoke(xi)   drink(xi)} 
||[ti smoke or ti drinks]||s
ALT = {  xi O [smoke(xi)   drink(xi)]} 
14  
So, in the general case, alternatives are generated and grow freely. Each time we use 
them for enrichment, the set of alternatives shrinks. It is plausible to assume as a general 
felicity condition on utterances that if a set of alternatives is active (i.e. relevant) by the 
end, it must be used (i.e. alternatives, when active must lead to some form of enrichment). 
This can be seen as a generalization of the principle of relevance. 
(31)  If the speaker utters S and S is associated with a set of alternatives ALT, then use 
ALT to enrich S.  
                                      
14 Technically, this tantamounts to saying that alternatives are specified not just relative to an 
expression, but relative to an expression and one of its interpretation. So, for each expression , 
what gets actually deifned is <  , p >
 ALT, where p is one of  ’s interpretations (i.e. p = || ||  or p   
|| ||s). Cf. Appendix III.                                                                                                                   15 
If we stuck to what we just said, its net effect of would be that the only way to 
strengthen something like (26a) would be as in (26b); something like O [some (one)  xi  
[smoke(xi)   drink(xi)]] comes out undefined. However, this seems too strong. For consider 
a discourse like: 
(31)   I am positive that some of my students smoke or drink and I believe that, in fact, 
some of them may well do both. 
In this discourse we seem to be intending the implicature associated with some (i.e. the 
outermost scalar item) while we are explicitly removing the implicature associated with or 
(i.e. the embedded one), something our system, as sketched so far, seems to disallow. It can 
happen, in other words, that something in the common ground or in the discourse makes it 
clear that the scalar alternatives are either irrelevant or otherwise excluded, as in example 
(31). Scalar alternatives are active by default, but can be deactivated by information present 
in the context. One way of implementing technically this idea is by assuming that each 
scalar term S has a two predictable lexical variants S[+/- ] (related by a (trivial) lexical 
shift); the strong variant S[+ ] has active alternatives and lead to enrichment; the weak 
variant S[- ]doesn’t activate scalar alternatives. In a context  that disfavors the activation of 
alternatives, we choose S[- ] over S[+ ].Assume, further, that for OC[p] to be well formed, C 
must  be  appropriately  filled  (i.e.  the  assertion  p  must  have  alternatives  different  from 
itself). This way something like OC [p or[+ ] q] is felicitous, while OC [p or[-  ] q] is not. So, 
the  intended  reading  of  example  (31)  can  be  represented  as  O  [some[+ ]  (one)  xi  
[smoke(xi)  [- ] drink(xi)]]. (We will omit marking the  –subscript on a scalar term if the 
context makes it clear which is intended). 
  Summing up, a sentence like (26a) can be strengthened in the following ways: 
(32)  ||someonei [ti smoke or ti drinks]||s=   
{ O [some[+ ] (one)  xi O [smoke(xi)  [+ ] drink(xi)],  
   O [some[+ ] (one)  xi [smoke(xi)  [- ] drink(xi)],  
   [some[-  ] (one)  xi O [smoke(xi)  [+ ] drink(xi)] } 
  This in turn entails that if we think of || ||s as a procedure that assigns to expressions their  
enriched meanings, we must not think of it as a function, but as a relation (or alternatively, 
we must think of it as defining a range of admissible enriched interpretations). The set in 
(32)  constitutes  the  admissible  strengthened  interpretations  of  a  sentence  of  the  form 
someone  p or q; which one we pick among those, depends on which of the (lexically 
activated)  set  of  scalar  alternatives  actually  fits  the  context  (where  in  absence  of 
information  to  the  contrary,  we  presume  that  the  strongest  does).  Generally,  in  what 
follows, I’ll focus the discussion on the strongest options. 
  It might be worth underscoring that use of lexical features like [+/- ] does not turn 
the present approach to a ri-edition of an ambiguity approach to scalar implicatures. This is 
so not only because scalar entries are predictable variants of each other, but especially 
because our theory predicts a specific distribution of strengthened readings in DE vs non 
DE contexts. In particular, as we know from the discussion in section 3.1., the present 
theory predicts patterns of the following sort: 
(29)     a. John doubts that many[+ ] of your students complained                                                                                                                   16 
b.  * ¬ believe (j , OC many[+ ] (of your students)(complained) 
c.  OC ¬ believe (j , many[+ ] (of your students)(complained)  
d. John believes that many[+ ] of your students complained 
e.  believe (j , OC many[+ ] (of your students)(complained) 
f.  * OC believe (j , many[+ ] (of your students)(complained)  
It is very unclear how an approach that simply says that scalar lexical entries are ambiguous 
could make similar predictions.  
The full power of the present system can be appreciated even more if we consider 
multiple occurrences of scalar items within DE contexts. Here is a moderately complicated 
example: 
(34)  a. No one who smokes and[+ ] drinks lives up to 80[+ ] 
  b. There are people who smoke or drink (but not both) and live up to 80 
  c. There are people who smoke and drink and live to an age close to 80. 
Assuming that the scalar terms and and 80 have active alternatives, sentence (34a) can well 
be  
used to implicate (34b) and (34c). So its strong meaning should be (34a) plus (29b) and 
(29c).  
This  is  indeed  what  our  definition  of  application  predicts;  and  it  is  perhaps  worth 
underscoring  
that the intended result cannot be obtained through a single application of the O-operator. 
We have to use it twice as follows: 
(35)     a. O[O [no (  xi one(xi)    smoke(xi)   drink(xi))](lives up to 80)]  
b. O [no (  xi one(xi)    smoke(xi)   drink(xi))] 
The  square  brackets  in  (35a)  indicate  the  scope  of  O.  Consider  in  particular  the  most 
embedded occurrence of O, isolated in (35b). As the type of no one smokes and drinks is 
<<e,t>,t>, we have to generalize O to such type (cf. Rooth (19xx)). So, in working (35b) 
out, the alternatives we would be considering are of the form: 
(35)     { P. no one who smokes and drinks P ,  P. no one who smokes or drinks P},  
P a variable over properties. 
As usual, O says that the only alternative that is going to hold is the one (that is going to be) 
uttered. So we get: 
(36) O [no( x one(x)    smoke(x)   drink(x))] =  
 =   P[no( x  one(x)     smoke(x)     drink(x))(P)   ¬no( x  one(x)     (smoke(x)    
drink(x)))(P)]  
 =   P[no( x  one(x)     smoke(x)     drink(x))(P)     some( x  one(x)     (smoke(x)    
drink(x)))(P)] 
When the argument corresponding to the VP comes in, the second occurrence of O takes its 
usual course and, at the end of the day, we get the intended strengthened reading for (34a). 
The  fact  that  the  strengthening  of  expressions  headed  by  a  DE  function  requires  this 
stepwise, argument by argument, subclausal application of O, suggests that it is indeed 
right making it part of the definition of application itself (as per definition xx, above). 
Contrary to what happens for non DE contexts, the application of strengthening to DE                                                                                                                   17 
contexts  cannot  be  readily  accomplished  via  a  clausal  application  of  O  (or  whatever 
subsumes its effects).
15 
  We thus see that a consideration of multiple scalar implicatures yields interestingly  
complex  patterns  that  can  be  handled  in  reasonably  systematic  ways,  in  spite  of  their 
complexity.  
The basic generalizations we propose are (i) that enrichment takes place cyclically bottom 
up and  
that  (ii)  when  we  apply  a function  f  to  an  argument  A,  if  f  is  not  DE,  we  enrich  the 
argument  
f(O[A]); if f is DE enrich the result O[f(A)] (“recalibration”). In either case, addition of SIs 
leads  
to strengthening.  
While this seems to be generally correct, there are also cases of enrichment that 
don’t lead to strengthening. Such cases too must somehow fit into the picture. 
 
3.3. “Frozen” implicatures. 
    Consider an example like 
(38) If many students complained, we are in trouble 
Within sentence (38), the sentence many students complained appears embedded in the 
antecedent of a conditional, a downward entailing context. And in fact the (most salient) 
enriched interpretation of (38) is not something like (39a) but, if anything, something like 
(39b): 
(39)a. If it many but not all students complained, we are in trouble 
b. If many students complained, we are in trouble,  
while if few students complained we are (probably) O.K. 
  If we express these options through the O-operator, here is what we get: 
(40)  a. if O[many students complained], we are in trouble 
b. O [if many students complained, we are in trouble] 
The  scopes  in  (40a-b)  correspond  to  the  interpretations  (39a-b),  respectively.  The 
preference for the interpretation represented by (40b) is in line with the preference for the 
strongest  interpretation  (i.e.  the  option  we  have  already  encountered  and  discussed). 
However, there are cases in which a reading isomorphic to (40a) seems to emerge as the 
preferred one. Consider for example the following discourse 
(41) If many students complained, then we are better off than if all did 
For sentence (41)  to make sense, the antecedent has to be interpreted as follows: 
(34)   If many though not all students complained, then we are better off than if all did. 
This  type  of  cases  (discussed  in  Levinson  2000)  seem  to  involve  an  interpretation 
isomorphic to (40a). Now, as the reader can readily verify, interpretations of this sort are in 
fact weaker than the plain assertion. In general is it easy to show that: 
(41)   [p   q]   [O[p]   q]  (where ‘ ’ stands for “entails” ) 
                                      
15 An even more complicated case (discussed in Chierchia 2004) is: 
(a) Few people that smoke and drink live up to 80 
This has also the implicature “some do…”. Scalar enrichments of this complexity are not discussed 
in proposals alternative to the present one like, e.g., such as Sauerland (xx) or Fox (xx).                                                                                                                   18 
So (49a) is an example of an enriched meaning that is not a strengthened meaning. Our 
system is designed to obtain strengthened meanings. And, as it stands, does not afford us 
interpretations like (4a). In Chierchia (2004), I suggested that they are to obtained through 
something like domain selection. Here I wish to explore a different possibility, directly 
inspired  by  Fox  (xx).  We  can  imagine  introducing  at  LF  something  like  a  “strongest 
meaning” operator. So far, O has been used only in the semantic metalanguage; we might 
to introduce an analogue of O at LF. Such an operator, call it ‘ ’, quite literally “freezes” or 
“locks  in”  the  implicatures.     [S]  has  as  its  (plain)  meaning  the  (strongest)  enriched 
meaning of S compatible with the context. Once   applies to a constituent, the implicature 
of that constituent becomes part of its meaning and hence can no longer be removed or 
recalibrated.. Formally: 
(41)  ||   S|| =  ||S||s
16 
It is, in fact, tempting in this connection, to adopt one of the familiar syntactic 
modes of implementing this. For example, we might say that strong scalar items have an 
(uninterpretable)  syntactic  feature  [+   ]  that  needs  to  be  checked  by  an  (interpretable) 
abstract operator   (and viceversa:   has to have a [+ ] element in its scope). In the case 
under discussion, vis. (41), such an operator can be attached at different sites, namely: 
  (44) a.     IP 
           IP 
 
        CP    IP 
       
       if many[+ ] students complained 
b.        IP 
 
        CP        IP 
         
       if      IP 
 
         IP 
 
many[+ ] students complained 
 
Even though   is a sort of syntactic projection of O, it doesn’t quite coincide with it. 
For example, it can be shown that if p and q both contain scalar terms, then the following 
equivalence holds: 
(43)  a. ||   [p[+ ]   q[+ ]]|| =  O[p   O q] 
b. Example:   [if John drinks and[+ ] drives, he gets two[+ ] months probation]=   
  O [if John drinks and drives   O he gets two months probation] = 
                                      
16 Actually, since ||S||s may include the plain meaning, what we want is: 
||   S|| =   p[ p   ||S||s   q   ||S||s p   q ]  
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If John drinks and drives he gets two months (and no more) of probation while if he 
does only one of the two, he does not get two (or more) months probation  
This is so because a single occurrence of   can check simultaneously several occurrences 
of [+ ] (by analogy with wh-dependencies). Interpretively, this can correspond to several 
applications of the relevant enrichment operation (namely O). In general, a root application 
of   to a sentence S is going to lock in the strongest interpretation of S. 
  The present approach also rules out representations of the following sort, as cases of feature 
mismatches (where the second is a violation of minimality/intervention, however you want 
to cash in on it): 
(44)  a. *   [John smokes or[- ] drinks] 
  a’. smoke(j)   drink(j) 
  b. *   [John is either smoking or[- ] grading some[+ ] assignments] 
  b’.O [ smoke (j)   [- ]  some[+  ] (assignments)  x grading(j,x)] 
These are welcome results. Notice that (44a) would be interpreted as (44a’); this is per se 
innocent; however, the   operator would play no semantic role, something that is clearly 
uneconomic. In (44b), the situation is different (and worst). An LF like (44b) would be 
interpreted  as  (44b’),  where  the  alternatives  associated  with  some  are  active,  but  those 
associated with or are not.. The reader should be able to compute that (44b’) entails that 
John is not smoking, something we clearly don’t want as a possible meaning sentences like 
(44b) (cf. Chierchia 2004, Fox xx for further discussion). It should also be emphasized that 
these result are obtained using completely standard assumptions on feature checking (or its 
equivalent). 
The introduction of a strong assertion operator constitutes a departure from  
Chierchia (2004). The link between that proposal and the present one is in the definition in 
(42):   is defined in terms of the recursively characterized notion of enriched interpretation, 
|| ||S (which remains essentially the same as before). There are close antecedents in the 
literature to this use of assertoric operators. One is Rooth’s xx focus operator, that marks at 
LF the site at which focal alternatives are factored into the meaning. Also Krifka (19xx) 
proposes a couple of similar operators in order to deal with any; part of our goal is to 
provide  further arguments that Krifka’s operators are indeed motivated by the behavior of 
SIs. Finally, Fox (xx) proposes to deal with SIs in terms of an abstract only-operator. In our 
terms, Fox’s proposal can be viewed as the reverse of the present one. Rather than defining 
recursively  enriched  meanings  (i.e.  ||    ||S)  and  then  specify  the  semantics  of  a  strong-
meaning operator in terms of || ||S, Fox introduces directly such an operator in the syntax; 
then  a  definition  of  enriched  meaning  can  be  specified  as,  roughly,  an  LF  containing 
occurrences of   in appropriate places. Putting aside questions of detail, there are two main 
reasons that lead me to prefer the present option. The first is that, as we saw, an “abstract 
only” won’t quite do in DE contexts: the semantics of such an operator would have to be 
duly articulated to get such contexts right (and it remains to be seen whether once this is 
done we wind up with a proposal essentially different from the present one). Second, as we 
shall see shortly, pragmatic enrichment doesn’t always take the form of exhaustivization. 
Other  options,  associated  with  the  activation  of  different  sets  of  alternatives,  must  be 
countenanced. The indirect path we follow will enable us to do so in an arguably principled 
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This is all quite sketchy (something only partially remedied in the appendix), but 
perhaps sufficient to our purposes. What we have tried to do in this section is setting up a 
sufficiently  explicit  formal  machine  (which  can  be  provided  with  some  independent 
motivation) in order to formulate a (partly new) theory of polarity phenomena building on 
the Domain Widening idea. To the formulation of such a theory we now turn. 
 
 
4. Negative Polarity. 
 In this section we will address the issue of “pure” NPIs, namely items like mai/ever 
that  disallow  FC  uses  (also  minimizers  like  lift  a  finger  would  fall  into  this  category). 
However, for convenience, we will illustrate our proposal mostly with any, focusing on its 
NP facet. The reader should bear in mind that a more adequate characterization of items of 
the any type will have to wait until section 5. 
4.1. “Large” Domain-alternatives. 
    Recursive  pragmatics  enables  us  to  systematize  (and,  in  a  sense,  integrate)  the 
proposals by Kadmon and Landman, Krifka, and Lahiri on NPIs. To see how, I will start out 
with  a  proposal  close  to  Krifka’s.  Then I  will modify  it  in  ways  that  will  bring  out  its 
connections to the others. Recall the basic idea: (NP) any in English has the same meaning as 
an indefinite like some, plus DW. I will work towards my proposed implementation of this 
insight through an example. 
    Let  us  assume  that  every  predicate  carries  a  world  variable,  which  is  filled 
according to general principles (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982; for a recent proposal, see 
Percus  (2000)).  Furthermore,  let  us  assume  that  quantification  (and  abstraction)  can  be 
restricted to contextually salient domains. Here is a simple example: 
(29)  a. I saw a/some boy 
    b.  w  x Dw [boyw(x)   saww(I, x)] 
Formula (29b) is the proposition expressed by (29a).
17 I use set variables D, D’, etc. to mark 
the (salient) quantificational domain associated with DPs: if someone utters (29a) one does 
so with a specific domain in mind (say, what is around us), for otherwise such a sentence 
could hardly ever be informative. The interpretation of D may vary from speaker to speaker; 
in spite of this, we understand each other because evidently our choices of D’s overlap to a 
significant degree. D typically includes individuals that we are  sure to exist, along with 
individuals we may be less sure about. Take, for example, our neighbor Fred. For all we 
know,  he  might  or  might  not  have  sons.  So,  depending  on  specific  aspects  of  the 
conversational dynamics, D might include Fred’s possible sons or not. Given a set D, Dw are 
those members of D that actually exists in w. Fred’s sons will be in Dw only if it turns out 
that in fact they exist in w. Adding (29b) to a common ground (the set of worlds that for all 
the illocutionary agents mutually believe, might be actual)
18 excludes from such common 
                                      
17 Here and throughout I ignore the (important) differences between a and some. 
18 The standard reference on the notion of “Common Ground” is Stalnaker (1878). The proposal in 
the text, which uses world bound domains, can, perhaps, be viewed as a way of getting “Domain 
vagueness”, which Dayal (1998) argues is characteristic of PSIs. Notice, in fact, the resemblance 
with supervaluations (where each alternative corresponds to a partial interpretation). For further 
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ground the worlds w’ in which no member of D existing in w’ is a boy I saw. Nothing new or 
particularly controversial so far (within a possible worlds semantics). 
    Now, the core meaning of a sentence involving any is just like (29) plus domain 
widening. I believe that DW takes place along two dimensions. First, we pick the largest of 
possible  quantificational  domain  among  the  reasonable  candidates.  This  means  that  all 
entities  that  for  all  we  know  might  exist  are  factored  in.  Second,  our  uncertainty  about 
quantificational domains may have some qualitative aspects. Take Fred again; and consider 
now his nephew John; we are sure that John exists; but we may be uncertain as to whether he 
is a man or still a boy; this means that in some worlds compatible with what we know he is a 
boy, in others he isn’t; using any boy we might signal that our claim extends to him.  
How do we express this formally?. Let us consider sheer domain size first. The only 
way to measure domain size is by comparison; this entails that the meaning of any must be 
inherently  relational.  It  must  involve  comparison  among  D-alternatives.  It  is  useful  to 
visualize this with a toy example. 
(30)  a. A system of “large” domains 
    D = { a, b, c}    widest domain 
D1 = {a,b}     
D2 = {b,c}     
    D3 = {a,c} 
Suppose D1-D3 are candidate domains for what’s around here; then any would be associated 
with their union D = D1 D2 D3. In doing so, we still have anchoring to a specific D; with 
the understanding that it is the largest one (among the alternatives at stake). 
Consider  next  the  inclusion  of  “marginal”  boys.  This  must  amount  to  a  kind  of 
modalization:  we  include  into  consideration  all  those  individuals  that  in  some  world 
compatible with what we know are boys. Putting all this together, a sentence like (31a) (if it 
was grammatical) would have (31b) as its meaning; This has to be considered against the 
alternatives in (31c): 
(31)  a. I saw any boy 
    b. Meaning:  x Dw  w’ [boyw’(x)   saww(I, x)] 
19 
    c. Alternatives:  x Di,w  w’ [boyw’(x)   saww(I, x)]  
        where 1 i 3 
Active  alternatives  must  be  used  to  enrich  plain  meaning  (by  our  extended  principle  of 
relevance). But what kind of enrichment is appropriate to any on the basis of the type of 
alternatives that by hypothesis it associates with? Given that D-alternatives do not form a 
scale,  use  of  O  (i.e.  exhausivization)  seems  inappropriate.  Still,  in  choosing  among 
alternatives, speakers do tend to go for the strongest one they have evidence for. If this 
happens also in the case of (31), we might be saying that even the most liberal (i.e. broad) 
choice of D makes the sentence true: the base  meaning will acquire, in other words, an 
                                      
19 From now on, and when no confusion arise, I will omit ‘ w’ from formulae. So for example the 
formula in (31b) is to be understood as a short form for: 
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“even” like flavor (as both Krifka xx and Lahiri xx propose). 
20 Let us spell this implicature 
out: 
(32)  Implicature:   
  .    x Dw  w’ [boyw’(x)   saww(I, x)] <c   x Di, w  w’[boyw’(x)   saww(I, x)] 
    where 1   i   3 and p <c q = p is stronger/less likely than q relatively to the  
    common ground c. 
However, given the way the domains are chosen, (32) is logically false. This is so, 
because any of the alternatives in (31c) is logically stronger than the statement (31b); and 
hence the latter  statement cannot be less likely than the former. It follows that sentence 
(31a) enriched by implicature (32) is inconsistent. Whence its deviance.      
Contrast this with what would happen in a negative (DE) context. 
(34)  a. I didn’t se anyD boy  
  b.  statement:  ¬  x Dw  w’ [boyrw’(x)   seew(I, x)] 
       c. implicature: ¬  x Dw  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x) <c 
               ¬  x Di,w  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x)] 
The statement (34b) plus the implicature are consistent. This constitutes a green light to 
adding it to our common ground. Such an addition is going to inform us that no matter what 
subset of D might turn out to be the actual domain, I saw nothing in that domain that could 
possibly be a boy . Domain widening yields its effects.  
  The appeal of this general line should be fairly clear. The even- like implicature 
arises  from  general  Gricean  principles  (once  one  sees  what  the  alternatives  under 
consideration are). And it is also immediately clear that such an implicature just cannot be 
met in positive contexts, which explains the distribution of NPIs. But with this, also a 
potential problem comes readily to mind: implicatures that clash with the assertion do not 
generally yield ungrammaticality; they are simply removed (exploiting clashes of this sort 
is, in fact, the way implicatures are typically cancelled). So how come is something like 
(31) (an NPI licensing violation) ungrammatical? There is an impasse here between the 
way  in  which  domain  widening  explains  the  distribution  of  NPIs  (through  Gricean 
principles)  and  how  such  principles  are  typically  taken  to  work.  The  different  lines 
explored by Kadmon and Landman, Krifka, and Lahiri can be viewed, in fact, as different 
ways of reacting to such an impasse.    
                                      
20 Actually, our proposal corresponds to what Krifka proposes for what he calls “emphatic” any. 
For non emphatic any, he  proposes a purely scalar approach. According to it, asserting a sentence 
like (a) leads to the simultaneous negation of all weaker alternatives (as in scalar reasoning). The 
result,  in  positive  contexts,  is  however  contradictory,  for  it  is  impossible  for  an  existential 
statement to be true in D without also being true in some of its subdomains. In negative contexts, 
per  contra,  one  obtains  a  sensible  meaning.  Such  an  approach  makes  wrong  predictions  for 
sentences like 
(a) * There must be any student in that building 
The presence of a modal makes Krifka’s proposed implicature coherent (something we must leave 
to the reader to verify). Consequently, (a) is predicted to be grammatical, contrary to fact. Krifka’s 
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Evidently  while  scalar  alternatives  may  be  disactivated  by  the  context,  D 
alternatives cannot. Within “recursive” pragmatics, we have a possibly principled way of 
addressing this issue. Our approach to SIs has lead us to posit two variants of scalar terms: 
a strong [+ ] variant, with active alternatives that need to be used for enrichment; and a 
weak [- ] variant with no active alternatives, for which no   is necessary (or possible). In 
this set up it is indeed natural to expect that there be items associated with alternatives that 
cannot be disactivated: [+ ] items with no weak alternant.  The effect of this is that such 
items (in the case at hand, NPIs) will have to occur within the scope of  ; their implicature 
has to be frozen in place, through an abstract operator  . From a functionalistic stand point, 
this makes sense. If the role of domain widening is to induce an implicature, using an NPI 
in a context where such an implicature could not arise is self defeating. So, we can assume 
that  NPIs  carry  an  (uninterpretable)  feature  (specifically,  a  piece  of  possibly  abstract 
negative morphology) that needs to be checked by an appropriate (interpretable) operator 
(namely  ). NPIs must be checked by   (i.e., if you prefer, enter an agreement relation with 
something     can  attach  to).  The  fact  that  NPIs  need     provides,  in  a  way,  further 
independent evidence for it. 
    Let us spell this out. We can assume that besides O, another available mode of 
enrichment is E (for ‘even’), defined as follows: 
(33)  EC(p) = p    q  C [p <c q], where C = ALT 
The choice between O and E is dictated by the nature of the alternatives: if (and, ideally, only 
if) C contains a scale, O is felicitous; if (and, ideally, only if) C contains partially ordered 
propositions, like D-variants, E is felicitous.
 21 In (34a) I specify an “official” lexical entry 
for any (but cf. appendix xx) and the alternatives it activates; in (34b), I spell out the specific 
form of pragmatic strengthening associated with DW. 
  (34)  a. Lexical entry for any: 
  i.   ||anyD|| =  P Q  w [ x Dw  w’ (Pw’(x))   Qw(x)]   
ii.  ALT(||anyD||) = {  P Q  w [ x D’w  w’(Pw(x)   Qw(x)]: D’   D   
  D’ is large} 
    iii.   any has an uninterpretable feature [+  ] 
b. || ||s   EC(|| ||), where C = || ||
ALT  
As  with  O,  use  of  E  shrinks  the  set  of  alternatives.  Now,  let  us  go  back  to  the 
ungrammatical example (31a). In virtue of (34iii), it must occur in the scope of ‘ ’. So here 
is what we get: 
(35)  a. * I saw any boy 
  b.   [I saw any boy] 
           |________| 
    c. EC( x Dw  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x)) 
    d.  x Dw  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x) <c  x Di,w  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x)]  
                                      
21 Notice that if C contains scalar alternatives, EC(p) yields a non contradictory statement only if p 
is  the  strongest  member  of  the  scale.  Perhaps  we  might  require  that  a  form  of  enrichment  is 
felicitous only if it yields meaningful results for all the alternatives at stake. That way we wouldn’t 
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Any carries a feature that needs to be checked by  . As   can be adjoined to clausal nodes, 
we do so in (35b) and the syntactic requirement on any is duly met. However,   locks in the 
implicature. Thus the interpretation of (35b) is (35c). And this is a unusable contradiction 
(as the implicature it carries, viz. (35b) is necessarily false). No way out. Contrast this with 
what happens in a negative context (like (33) above, repeated here): 
(36)  a. I didn’t see any boy 
  b.   ¬ [I see any boy] 
           |________| 
c. EC(¬ x Dw  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x)) 
    d. ¬ x Dw  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x) <c ¬ x Di,w  w’[boyw’(x)   seew(I, x)]  
 
In a sentence like (36a),  we have an additional site at which the feature associated with any 
can be checked, namely after negation. The semantics we get this time is perfectly sensible. 
And domain widening comes happily to fruition (in the sense that using it has lead to 
something stronger than the available alternatives). This generalizes to all DE contexts. We 
now see exactly how the computational system forces NPIs to occur in DE contexts. 
  Perhaps, a couple observations are appropriate. First,   can be thought of as what 
makes  negation  (and  other  DE  heads)  “strong”  or  “affective”  (giving  precise  semantic 
content to this notion). And second, one might expect the special morphology that induces 
checking or agreement with the implicature freezing operator   to be sometimes “visible”. 
Cases of “negative concord” can be viewed in this light: 
(39)  a. non ho visto nessuno studente parlare a nessun professore 
      (I) not saw no student speak with no professor 
  b.   ¬ [I saw any student speak with any professor] 
It is tempting (following, in a renewed set up, the insights of Laka 1990 and Ladusaw 
1992) to explain negative concord along the following lines. N-words in languages like 
Italian  have  roughly  the  same  semantics  as  (NPI)  any.  They  are,  therefore,  domain 
widening  existentials.  This  forces  checking  by   ,  which  can  only  yield  something 
interpretable in conjunction with negation and other negation like operators. That is why 
negation  must  be  present  and  can  affect  more  than  one  N-word  (without  resulting  in 
multiple negations). Moreover, since in the case of N-words, the NPI actually carries a 
piece of overt negative morphology, the locality conditions on checking and the range of 
heads that can sustain   and do the job may be more strictly defined than those associated 
with any. This, in fact, seems to be supported also by language internal evidence: nessuno , 
lit. ‘no one’ has a narrower distribution than any (e.g. it is not licensed in the restriction of 
every); mai ‘ever’, where overt negative morphology is opaque, has, instead, a distribution 
very similar to that of any. There is obviously a lot of work do be done in this connection. 
But the division of labor between syntax and semantics looks promising. 
  A general criticism that has been leveled against the DW idea is that widening 
doesn’t seem to always have to take place. This is particularly evident with N-words. A 
sentence like (39a) can be used having a specific salient domain in mind, just like its 
English  translation,  and  doesn’t  necessarily  require  expanding  such  domain  to  include 
marginal cases. As it turns out, this is, in fact, consistent with the use of DW adopted here. 
The lexical entry for an NPI (cf. 34a) contains an implicit reference to a specific domain, 
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pragmatically  set  domain.  However,  alternatives  are  activated,  and  they  automatically 
generate  the  relevant  implicature.  And  such  implicature  cannot  be  cancelled.  This 
mechanism sometimes will reflect real uncertainty on the quantificational domain. But this 
doesn’t have to always happen: sometimes we merely have a formal requirement that limits 
indefinites subject to it to DE contexts. Power of grammaticization, if you wish. DW, as 
implemented here, is potential for domain widening. 
  Summing up, we see how what is common to the proposals that exploit DW for 
NPIs  re-emerges  in  the  present  approach.  The  lexical  entry  for  any  activates  domain 
alternatives, which generate an implicature according to completely general principles. We 
know that sometimes implicatures can be frozen in place. The implicature associated with 
NPIs has to (via agreement or checking with the operator responsible for freezing). This 
only works in DE contexts. We have done little more than implement the DW idea in 
“recursive pragmatics”. 
4.2. Intervention. 
As  is  known  since  at  least  Linebarger  (xx),  NPIs  are  subject  to  “intervention” 
effects. I’ve argued  in Chierchia (2004) that NPI intervention is due to implicatures. While 
I will not be able to present here in full the arguments in favor of such a view, I will none 
the less give a sketch of how the account (in a slightly modified form) goes. This is useful, 
as it will give us a glimpse of how multiple alternatives can be handled (which will come in 
handy later on).  
Here is a typical minimal pair that illustrates the relevant phenomenon: 
  (41)  a. It’s never the case that a new doctor has any experience 
    b. ?? It’s never the case that every new doctor has any experience. 
In both (41a) and (41b), any is separated from its licensor never by a scalar term (a and 
every,  respectively).  Intervention  of    every  yields  a  degraded  grammaticality  judgment, 
while intervention of a does not. Why?  
Let us begin with (41b). Its initial representation must be something like (42a); hence 
its LF must be either (42b) or (42c): 
(42)     a. not [ every[+ ] new doctor has any[+ ] experience] 
b. not   [every[+ ] new doctor has any[+ ] experience] 
c.   not [every[+ ] new doctor has any[+ ] experience] 
Any must be in the scope of (checked by)  . And the are two options for meeting this 
requirement are represented in (43b-c). However, option (43b) is clearly doomed to failure: 
adding the implicature triggered by D-widening to [every new doctor has any experience] 
(i.e. in a in positive contexts) results in contradiction. So (43c) is really our only chance. 
But now let us see what happens. Recall that alternatives cumulate till they are used by 
some enrichment operation. So here is how the alternatives associated with (42a) are going 
to look like: 
(44)  not [every doctor has anyD experience],…., not [some doctor has anyD experience] 
  not [every doctor has anyD1 experience],…., not [some doctor has anyD1 experience] 
  not [every doctor has anyD2 experience],…., not [some doctor has anyD2 experience] 
  …. 
Lines  represent  scales  (including  the  scale  associated  with  the  assertion);  the  column 
represent D-alternatives (where for each i, Di   D). Now according to our approach to 
implicature projection, when a DE function (not in the case of (43)) applies to its argument, 
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(43)     || not [every doctor has anyD experience])||S =      
  [Cf. (26) sec. 3.1] 
= O(not [every doctor has anyD experience]) =        
not [every doctor has anyD experience]   [some doctor has anyD experience] 
  Given this, the alternatives to (44) become: 
(44)     O(not [every doctor has anyD1 experience]) 
O(not [every doctor has anyD2 experience]) 
… 
At this point, the implicatures associated with the D-alternatives will have to be factored in. 
The result will be: 
(45)     a. E(O(not [every doctor has anyD experience])) =  
b. = O(not [every doctor has anyD experience]) <C O(not [every doctor has anyDi experience]) 
(for any i)  
c. = i.  not [every doctor has anyD experience]   [some doctor has anyD experience] 
            <C 
       ii. not [every doctor has anyDi experience]   [some doctor has anyDi experience] 
However, (45b) fails. This can be seen most easily from (45c); for it to obtain, the assertion 
(namely (45.c.i) ought to be logically stronger than any of the alternatives (namely 45.c.ii). 
But it is easy to check that this is not so: while the first conjunct in (45.c.i) indeed entails 
the first conjunct in (46.c.ii), for the second conjunct it is exactly the opposite. Moral: the 
only available strong meaning (i.e. the one in which all the alternatives have been used) is 
contradictory: 
(46)   ||  not [every new doctor has any experience]|| =   
Whence it deviance. 
  Contrast this with what happens in the case of (41a), repeated here, which is instead 
grammatical: 
(47)     a. It’s never the case that a new doctor has any experience 
b.   not [a[+ ] new doctor has any[+ ] experience] 
Let us assume that the set of alternatives is the same as that of every (i.e.(44)).
22 The crucial 
difference is in the first step, viz.: 
(48)     || not [a doctor has anyD experience])||S =       [Cf.  (26),  sec. 
3.1] 
= O(not [a doctor has anyD experience]) =        
not [a doctor has anyD experience] 
  The point is that under negation a becomes the strongest member of its scale; and whenever  
some p is the strongest member of a scale C, we get of course that OC(p) = p. So no scalar 
implicature arises. And the alternatives to (49) will be: 
(49)     not [a doctor has anyD1 experience] 
not [a doctor has anyD2 experience] 
…. 
At this point, the even-implicature, triggered by the presence of D-alternatives will follow 
its usual course. And we get: 
(50)  ||  not [a new doctor has any experience]|| = E(not [a doctor has anyD experience]) = 
                                      
22 Nothing changes in the argument if we assume that a, being a reduced form of the numerals, 
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= not [a doctor has anyD experience]   
   not [a doctor has anyD experience] <C  not [a doctor has anyDi experience] 
Domain widening yields in this case the right results.  
Summarizing,  if  Chierchia  (2004)  is  right,  the  basic  generalization  about  NPI 
intervention is that (i) it is triggered by strong members of a scale and (ii) the culprit is the 
implicature that such items give rise to in DE contexts; this generalization follows for free, 
given independent assumptions about SI projection and the semantics of NPIs.  Notice, 
furthermore, that the following representation would not be grammatical: 
(51)  not   [every[-  ] new doctor has any[+ ] experience] 
This is a straightforwad featural mismatch (the “syntactic” side of intervention). The effect 
of this is that in combination with NPIs with must use the strong version of scalar items.
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Just one more case to complete the picture. Consider: 
(52)     a. Few students understood anything 
b. Some students understood something 
Sentence (52a) is grammatical (i.e. any is properly licensed); and it triggers the implicature 
in (52b). From the point of view of our generalization, this might be surprising, for we are 
claiming that scalar implicatures in some sense prevent D-widening from triggering their 
even-implicature. Yet in (52b) there clearly is/can be a scalar implicature. How is that 
possible? To see how things go, consider first the plain meaning associated with (52a) and 
its alternatives: 
(53)     a. few(students)(understood anythingD) 
b. few(students)(understood anythingD) , no(students)(understood anythingD) 
    few(students)(understood anythingD1) , no(students)(understood anythingD1) 
    few(students)(understood anythingD2) , no(students)(understood anythingD2) 
       … 
Few is a DE function; DE functions involve recalibration, i.e. automatic insertion of O as in 
(44); however, O can apply only if in presence of a scale; and the arguments of few in 
(54a),  namely  students  and  understood  anything,  do  not  contain  scales  (the  scale  is 
associated with few itself). Hence O cannot apply in such a case as an automatic part of 
function application (cf. fn 11, sec. 3.1.xx). So we wind up with (53a-b). Now we have to 
discharge the alternatives. Given that the alternative contain both scales and D-variants, we 
have to use both O and E. But enrichment (at scope sites) is free. It can apply in any order. 
So we have two possible outcomes, namely 
(53)   a. O(E(few(students)(understood anythingD))) 
b. E(O(few(students)(understood anythingD))) 
In  (53b)  we  first  add  the  scalar  implicature,  then  the  D-implicature.  This  won’t  work 
(essentially for the same reasons why (46) doesn’t work: the scalar implicatures gets added 
in first and makes the even-implicature contradictory). In (53a) we first add in the even-
implicature (and discharge D-alternatives); then we compute the scalar implicature. By this 
route, we get the right results.  
To put it differently, there are two candidate strong meanings, namely: 
(54)     ||  few[+ ]students understood anything[+ ]]||   
a. O(E(few(students)(understood anythingD))) =  
few(students)(understood anythingD)   
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few(students)(understood  anythingD)]  <C  few(students)(understood 
anythingDi)   
some(students)(understood anythingD)] 
b. E(O(few(students)(understood anythingD))) =   
Of these the only usable one is clearly (54a). 
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The facts are intricate. My sketch of the account leaves many details out. However, 
with the help of the appendix, readers might be able to reconstruct the relevant derivations 
and conclude on their own to what extent things work out the way I claim. Certainly, there 
is room for improvement when it comes to fine details of the algorithm for implicature 
projection.  What  is  important  is  (a)  the  principled  nature  of    interaction  of  scalar  and 
domain implicatures and (b) the fact that the pattern of intervention for which NPIs are well 
known falls into place once such interaction is taken into account. This provides strong 
evidence in favour of the view that certain form of implicatures are systematically exploited 
by the computational system of grammar. 
   
 
5. The birth of universal readings. 
    In this section, we will address the issue of FC of the any type (that allow NP uses) as 
well as that of FC of the qualunque type (that disallow NP uses) and discuss where their 
properties and quantificational force comes from. Then we will come back to the relation 
between these elements and pure NPIs. 
5.1. Antiexhaustiveness. 
One of the classic puzzles surrounding FC uses of elements like any is how come they 
so naturally seem to switch to a universal or quasi universal force, as the following standard 
examples illustrate: 
(40)     a. Any cat meows 
  b. Yesterday, any student that was around dropped by 
Now, indefinites, as is well known, are subject to “Quantificational Variability” effects: 
(41)  A cat with blue eyes is always/usually/never intelligent 
The quantificational force of an indefinite like a cat in (41) seems to be directly dependent 
on  that  of  the  quantificational  adverb.  This  insight,  which  has  given  rise  to  Discourse 
Representation Theory and its derivatives (e.g. Dynamic Semantics), makes it extremely 
tempting to try to view the universal force of FC any as arising through a quantificational 
adverb of some sort. Such line of analysis has been proposed and developed in several 
variants (cf. e.g. Kadmon and Landman 1993, or Giannakidou 2001). However, there are 
problems with it. For one thing, there are clear cases of universal construals of FC any 
which don’t involve genericity: in sentences like (40b), generic operators just ain’t around. 
The universal force of the FC item would have to come from something else and it is not 
clear what that would be. (Saying it comes from the modifier, seems ad hoc, for intersective 
modification doesn’t usually work that way). Moreover, as shown by Dayal (1988), FC any 
does  not  display  quantificational  variability  effects  in  ways  comparable  to  those  of 
indefinites like a cat. The following is an illustration: 
                                      
24 I.e. we should understand the semantics of the  –operator as follows: 
||   S|| =   p[ p   ||S||s   p       q   ||S||s p   q ]. 
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(42)  a. A lion is usually majestic      [from Dayal (1988)]   
b. * Any lion is usually majestic 
c. A philosopher is sometimes wrong 
d. Any philosopher is sometimes wrong 
In (42a-b) we have an individual level predicate, which is incompatible with a frequency 
interpretation of the quantificational adverb. Sentence (42a) is grammatical, because the 
indefinite in subject position can act as a variable bound by the adverb. This construal is 
impossible in (42b), as witnessed by its ungrammaticality. In (42c-d) we have a stage level 
predicate.  Sentence  (42c)  is  ambiguous  between  a  frequency  construal  of  the 
quantificational adverb (“A philosopher is such that there are occasions on which she is 
wrong”)  and  a  “variable”  reading  (“There  are  philosophers  who  are  wrong”);  sentence 
(42d), on the other hand only has the first reading. This pattern is hard to explain, if any-
indefinites are variable like (or, more neutrally, if the source of their quantificational force 
is the same as for a-indefinites). 
  On the basis of considerations of this sort, Dayal concludes that the universal force 
of FC uses of any has to be endogenous to any itself. Whence her proposal to view FC 
elements of this sort as modalized universal elements. She argues that this accounts for 
many  of  their  properties  (including,  e.g.,  subtrigging).  However,  this  move  seems  to 
increase the conceptual  distance between NP any and FC any. In one case we have an 
indefinite subject to DW. In the other a modalized universal element. Dayal is well aware 
of this problem and proposes that the unifying trait behind NPIs and FCIs has to be sought 
elsewhere, in what she calls “Domain Vagueness”. The intuition is that in felicitous uses of 
NPIs and FCIs what has to happen is that one  doesn’t know what the quantificational 
domain at stake is really like. While the intuition behind domain vagueness might be sound, 
problems  of  implementation  remain.  It  isn’t  clear,  for  example,  how  exactly  to  build 
domain vagueness into the lexical entry for any (Dayal does it sort of “globally”). But, 
more to the point, domain vagueness and domain widening are so close; why doesn’t just 
one of them suffice? Why do we need, in the end, two independent assumptions on the 
semantics of FC any: (i) that it is a modalized universal and (ii) that it is domain vague? As 
we will now see, a reconsideration of DW, and more specifically, a slightly different, but 
equally natural implicature derivable from it might provide us with a more integrated view. 
  Kratzer and Shymoyama, in their analysis of German Free Choice irgendein  have 
argued  that  DW  can  also  trigger  an  implicature  different  from  strengthening,  one  of 
extreme  uncertainty.  In  the  present  section,  I  am  going  to  extend  (a  variant  of)  their 
proposal to universal FCIs (namely, Italian [qualsiasi N ] and FC any ). I will postpone 
discussion of existential FCIs of the irgendein type until next section.  
  Imagine that the alternatives you consider are not domains of approximately equal 
size, but rather all of the possible choices (on a given totality). Imagine, in other words that 
the structure of the alternative domains is roughly the following: 
(43)          D = {a,b,c} 
      D1 = {a,b}  D2 = {b,c}  D3 = {a,c} 
 
      D4 = {a}  D5 = {b}  D6 = {c} 
Imagine now that against this finely structured range of alternatives you were to pick one, 
say D3 = {a.c} (by saying, for example, that someone in D3 is the culprit). What would that 
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you are excluding D5 (i.e. the complement of D3). The same holds for any other choice. 
So, conversely, what would, against the same background, the choice of D, i.e. the maximal 
option, convey? Plausibly, it would convey the opposite, namely that you do not exclude 
any option whatsoever. 
  This lays out the intuition. Now let us reconstruct it formally.  
(44)  a. (Yesterday) I saw any student (that wanted to see me) 
b.  Assertion:  x Dw w’[studentw’(x)   seew(I, x)] 
Abbreviated as: someD (student) ( x I saw x) 
c.  Potential alternatives: someDi (student) ( x I saw x), for any Di   D 
d.  Strengthened alternative assertions: O(someDi (student) ( x I saw x)) 
= someDi (student) ( x I saw x)  ¬ someD-Di (student) ( x I saw x)  
e.   Grice:  ¬ Know (speaker, O(someDi (student) ( x I saw x)) 
f.  Epistemic step: ¬  O(someDi (student) ( x I saw x)) 
g.  ¬ [someDi (student) ( x I saw x)   ¬ someD-Di (student) ( x I saw x)] 
The assertion is (44a) interpreted as (44b); it chooses explicitly the widest domain D. As 
we saw, such an assertion would compete with alternatives of the form in (44b), for every 
alternative domain Di in (43). Each such alternative, if chosen, would be strengthened (by 
exclusivization)  to  (44d)  .  Therefore,  by  standard  Gricean  reasoning,  choosing  (b)  the 
speaker signals she has no evidence that the (strengthened) alternative holds (44e). Then, 
the epistemic step follows its usual course, taking us to (44f); which is equivalent to (44g). 
Now a surprise comes. The implicature (44g) is equivalent to (45a). This, together 
with the assertion (44b), entails (45b): 
(45)   a.[ someDi (student) ( x I saw x)  someD-Di (student) ( x I saw x)] 
       (for any Di, containing possible students) 
  b.  D [someD (student) ( x I saw x) ] 
where D contains possible students 
A sentence like I saw any student(that wanted to see me) must, therefore, be true for any 
domain that stands a chance (containing a possible student that wants to se me). And a 
quasi universal reading, thereby, comes about. The assertion by itself doesn’t do it; and the 
implicature by itself doesn’t either. The universal force comes about by putting, as it were, 
two and two together (the assertion and the implicature). In doing so, we are using nothing 
more than plausible Gricean principles and DW, on the assumption that the D-alternatives 
form a “complete” lattice structure of the form in (43). 
  So what does the difference between pure NPIs (like ever or Italian N-words) and any 
amounts to? We are playing here with two kinds of implicatures. The NPI implicature is an 
even-implicature  (as  suggested  by  Krifka  and  Lahiri);  the  FC  implicature  is 
antiexhaustiveness (as suggested by Kratzer).
25 Clearly, it is not simply the context that 
determines which implicature is relevant. For example, Italian mai (or a minimizer like lift 
                                      
25  Kratzer  actually  discusses  the  FC  implicature  onl  in  the  context  of  what  we  call 
existential FC. She doesn’t exploit it to derive universal readings. 
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a finger)doesn’t tolerate FC uses; used in a positive context mai doesn’t trigger universal 
readings, it is simply ungrammatical. So it won’t do to say that by using DW in positive 
context, a FC implicature will naturally arise. The differences must stem from differences 
in the set of alternatives. “Large” alternatives naturally go with an even-like implicature; 
complete lattice structures go with antiexhaustiveness. It is not implausible that different 
lexical items may be associated with different sets of alternatives. So, here is a possible 
candidate for the lexical entry associated with FC any: 
(47)  ALT(anyD)
  = { P Q x D’w w’[Pw’(x)   Qw(I, x)]: D’   D  
  D’    x w’[Pw’ (x)]    } 
We  have  simply  replaced  the  condition  that  the  domains  be  “large”  with  the  one  that 
alternative domains must stand a chance (namely contain things that might possibly satisfy 
the restriction). So now even a D containing a single possible student (in the case of (44a)) 
will  be  in  the  alternative  set.  And  the  strengthening  operation  that  naturally  goes  with 
alternatives of this sort is antiexhaustivenes, viz: 
(48)  Antiexhaustiveness 
  || ||s   O
-
C|| || where C = || ||s
ALT and 
  O
-
C(p) = p     q C[q   q
-
] (where q
-
 is q’s complement; i.e. if D’ is q’s domain  
variable, then the domain variable of q
- 
is D-D’) 
  It is plausible to maintain that O
- 
can apply felicitously only when the alternative set of 
domains is  
closed under complementation.  
  Summing up so far, pure NPIs (like Italian N-words) are going to be associated with large 
D-alternatives. This is going to trigger an even-like alternative, E. And E confines pure 
NPIs to DE contexts. FCIs like are going to be associated with alternatives of any size 
(including small ones), which are going to trigger O
-
. Everything else stays the same. Both 
NPIs and FCIs must be checked by the implicature freezing operator. Here is a sample 
derivation involving FC any: 
(49)  a.   I saw any[+ ] student (that wanted to se me) 
  b.     [I saw any[+ ] student] 
c.   someD (student)  x I saw x    
  Di [someDi (student) ( x I saw x)   someD-Dj (student) ( x I saw x)] 
d.    a  possible student   D [I saw a] 
(I  keep  ignoring,  for  simplicity,  the  modifier  that  wanted  to  see  me).  Formula  (49d) 
constitutes a semi formal rendering of the assertion and the implicature together, which I 
am going to use from now for convenience.  
  It is interesting to consider, next, what happens to a FC element like any under negation. In 
principle, a sentence like (50a) might admit of two scope options. The first is illustrated in 
(50b)  
(50)  a. I didn’t see any student (that wanted to see me) 
  b.  ¬   [I saw any student]    
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Here negation has scope over the implicature freezing operator. Accordingly, we first lock 
the  implicature  in,  then  we  negate.  It’s  interpretation  is  (roughly)  as  in  (50c).  This 
corresponds to the “rethorical” reading of (50a): the “I didn’t see just any student” type.
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But there is also another possibility, illustrated in (51). We can first negate, then “check” 
the implicature.  
(51)  a    ¬ [I saw any[+ ] student] 
  b. statement: ¬ someD (student)  x I saw x 
  c. implicature:   Di  [¬  someDi (student) ( x I saw x)   ¬  someD-Di (student) ( x 
I saw x)] 
Now notice that (51b) entails (51c). To see this, drop the universal quantifier from (51c) 
instantiating it to an arbitrary Di in the alternative sets: 
(52) ¬  someDi (student) ( x I saw x)   ¬  someD-Di (student) ( x I saw x)] 
If D is (as per our hypothesis) the largest domain, it is clearly impossible that (51b) is true 
and (52) false, for (51b) entails both the antecedent and the consequent of (52). Conclusion: 
the implicature is automatically satisfied in any situation where the statement is true. Just 
like with “pure” NPIs, in negative contexts, we are left solely with DW; the FC implicature 
vanishes. 
  The conclusion is simple and, arguably, compelling: a lexical item with specifics in 
(47) is predicted to have a quasi universal force in positive contexts and to act as NPI in 
negative context. Its (similarity to and) difference from pure NPIs is very explicitly laid 
out:  it  is  a  difference  in  the  type  of  alternatives  activated.  This  explains  why  some 
languages  might  choose  different  lexical  entries  to  signal  association  with  different 
alternative sets; while others might opt to have one item covering both domains. It also 
explains why an item may start as a pure NPI and then turn into a FCI (by expanding its 
alternative sets) and viceversa. Finally, we also see that it is incorrect to think of any as 
“ambiguous” between an NPI and FC interpretation: English any has a unitary meaning viz. 
(47), which simultaneously accounts for its NPI uses (in DE contexts) and its FC uses in 
non DE contexts.  
5.2. Subtrigging. 
  In  Dayal  (1998)  several  of  the  key  generalizations  about  FCIs  like  any  were 
carefully  laid  out.  Her  conclusions,  as  we  saw,  were  that  English  any  is  “inherently” 
modalized, universally quantified, and domain vague. That insight seems to be basically 
correct. In fact, it fits with a view of polarity perhaps more general than one could hope for. 
The “inherent” part of her proposal needs to be qualified. The quantificational force of FC 
any is not written into its lexical entry. It stems from an implicature, triggered by the 
domain alternatives activated by it. Dayal also proposes an account of subtrigging which, in 
so far as I can make out, is the only one that stands a chance at being right among those 
currently available. The present subsection is devoted to showing how her account extends 
to our proposal.  
Consider sentence (53a) and its semantics, according to the present proposal (53b). 
                                      
26 It needs to be explained why the rethorical reading generally requires a special intonational 
contour. It would be desirable to derive this effect from the interaction of a principled proposal on 
FCIs (such as the present, arguably, is) and the theory of Focus. In the context of the present paper, 
I don’t have anything to say about this.                                                                                                                   33 
(53)  a. I saw any student 
  b.  D  x Dw w’[studentw’(x)   seew(I, x)] 
      where D contains at least a possible student 
What does (53b) actually say? In essence, that any possible student is such that I saw her. 
This and extremely strong statement; perhaps, too strong to ever be true. I can only see 
actually existing students; I cannot see something that does not exist. Because of our liberal 
take, D is surely going to include some such non existing entities. But this makes (53b) way 
too  strong  to  ever  be  true.  There  is  a  kind  of  presupposition  failure  here  between  the 
modalized character of the restriction and the episodic/actualistic character of the scope. It 
is  as  if  we  have  gone  too  far  with  our  domain  widening  to  the  point  of  obtaining  a 
restriction unsuitable to be used in episodic statements. 
  Consider now an occurrence of any “subtrigged” by a relative clause, like (54a). 
What would the structure of the restrictor be? Something like (54b) looks plausible: 
(55)     a. I saw any student that wanted to see me 
b.  D  x Dw w’[studentw’(x)   wantw(x,  w”seew”(x, me))   seew(I, x)] 
c. D   x w’[studentw’(x)   wantw(x,  w”seew”(x, me))    
d. .  x[studentw’(x)   wantw (x,  w”seew”(x, me))] 
In (55b), we have two world variables around. The one associated with the head noun 
student gets bound by any (as is generally the case). The relative clause, however, brings 
along a new variable (presumably, through the tense associated with the main verb want in 
the relative clause). Such a variable, eventually, gets associated with the actual world. The 
exact details of how this happens depend on specifics of the semantics of postnominal 
modifiers and tense sequencing. However, its outcome will, plausibly, be a restriction of 
the form given in (55c) (obtained through an intermediate stage which will look roughly as 
in (55d)). Such a restriction is going to contain  possible students that wanted in fact to see 
me (and hence they must be actual students). This results in a perfectly natural statement, 
one that can be satisfied. Thus, subtrigging provides us with the anchoring we need to be 
able to use FC (and hence modalized) items in episodic contexts. The general fact that FC 
items  can  be  used  in  episodic  contexts  only  subject  to  specific  restrictions  typically 
provided by a relative clause (but sometimes perhaps also by information present in the 
context) seems to receive a reasonable account. 
 
5.3. “Pure” FC items. 
  With this in place, we can now look at an interesting difference between Italian FC 
qualsiasi and English any, related to the puzzling behavior of qualunque under negation. 
As noted in section 2, an unmodified qualunque when negated seems to have only the 
rethorical “not just anyone” reading. For example: 
(55)  a. (?) Non ho visto qualunque studente 
           (I) not have seen whatever student   ‘I didn’t see just any student’ 
  b.  ¬   [I saw any student]    
  c. ¬  a  possible student   D [I saw a] 
Out of the blue, (55a) is awkward, unless intonation and/or context warrant a “not just 
anyone” interpretation. In our terms, this means that (55a) only admits of the LF in (55b), 
which results in the interpretation in (55c). The other option, which is available for any (cf. 
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“pure” FC element, that doesn’t “double up” as an NPI. In terms of the present proposal, 
we have to rule out, for qualunque, construals such as the one in (51a), where the freezing 
operator has scope over the DE operator. A not unreasonable way to obtain this effect is by 
insisting that the strengthened statement (i.e. the one with the implicature added in) lead to 
something that is indeed stronger than the plain one: the strengthened statement must, in 
other words, asymmetrically entail the plain one. Let us see how this does the trick in the 
case that interests us. Consider first a positive (non DE) context with qualunque: 
(56)  a. vedrò qualunque studente 
     (I) will see whatever student 
  b. statement: someD (student)  x I will see x 
  c. strengthened statement:  
    i. LF:    [I will see any student] 
    ii. Interpretation: someD (student) ( x I will see x)    
  Di [ someDi (student) ( x I will see x)    
someD-Di (student) ( x I will see x)] 
    =  a  possible student   D [I will see a] 
In this case, the strengthened statement asymmetrically entails the plain one. Consider, per 
contrast a negative context: 
(57)  a. non vedrò qualunque studente 
     (I) will see whatever student 
  b. statement: ¬ someD (student)  x I will see x 
  c. strengthened statement:  
    i. LF:   ¬ [I will see any student] 
    ii. Interpretation: : ¬ someD (student)  x I will see x    
      Di [¬ someDi (student) ( x I will see x)   
     ¬ someD-Di (student) ( x I will see x)] 
    = ¬ someD (student)  x I will see x 
As shown above, in this case, the strengthened statement turns out to be identical to the 
plain one. This state of affairs seems not to be tolerated by qualunque. Technically, this can 
be obtained by imposing a presupposition on the version of the freezing operator selected 
by qualunque: 
(58)  ||   || = ||   ||, if ||   || asymmetrically entails || ||; undefined otherwise 
Boldface   is just like   with a presupposition tacked in:   yields a felicitous statement 
only if the result of freezing the implicature returns something strictly stronger than the 
unenriched statement. We stipulate that “pure” FC elements like qualunque select for   (as 
opposed to  ). As a consequence of this, the implicature associated with it can only be 
frozen successfully in positive contexts (the result can then, of course, be embedded further 
as in (54)). 
  Evidence for this analysis comes from the puzzling facts observed in (14)-(16), sec. 
2, and repeated here. 
(59)  a. Non leggerò qualunque libro          ¬  (rethorical) 
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    b.  Non  leggerò  qualunque  libro  che  mi  consiglierà  Gianni       ¬  (/  ¬   );  ¬    
(rethorical) 
      (I) won’t read any book that Gianni will recommend to me. 
The  factual  generalization  is  that  while  the  rethorical  reading  is  the  only  option  for 
unmodified FC qualunque, another option becomes available when such items are modified 
(options which makes such items start act like NPIs). Now, we just saw how the rethorical 
reading for (a sentence like) (59a) is obtained and why the NPI reading is absent. However, 
a  further  possibility  is  expected,  since,  in  principle,  it  should  be  possible  to  scope  the 
embedded DP out. The corresponding LF would be: 
(60)  a. [qualunque libro]i  non leggerò ti 
  b.   [qualunque libro]i  non leggerò ti 
  c.  a  possible book   D   ¬ [I will read a] 
If  we  lock  the  implicature  in  after  having  scoped  the  object  out,  as  in  (60b),  the 
presuppositions  of  the  freezing  operator  are  met  (i.e.  we  obtain  something  which 
asymmetrically  entails  the  unenriched  interpretation  of  (60a)).  However,  the  result 
constitutes a subtrigging violation. Consequently, it will be ruled out by whatever rules 
things like I read any book out. This immediately predicts that subtrigging is going to 
rescue sentences like (60a), on the intended reading. This is indeed what (59b) seems to 
show. The relevant analysis is given in (61): 
(61)  a. [qualunque libro che mi consiglierà Gianni ]i  non leggerò ti 
  b.   [qualunque libro libro che mi consiglierà Gianni]i  non leggerò ti 
  c.  a  possible book that Gianni will recommend to me    D   ¬ [I will read a] 
What we have here is a  ¬  reading, which being equivalent to a ¬  , gives the impression 
that qualunque all of a sudden takes up an NPI behavior. But, as matter of fact, this isn’t so; 
and we now see why. So, an intricate pattern seems to fall into place in a rather principled 
fashion. 
  It  is  worth  summarizing  where  we  stand  so  far.  The  system  of  PSIs  can  be 
schematized as in the following chart: 
 (62)  The system of polarity sensitive items 
   [D-MAX]: pure NPIs [alcuno, mai, ever] 
     [D-MIN]: NPIs/FC  [any]  
   [D- MIN]: pure FC  [qualsiasi] 
What the elements in (62) have in common is that (i) they activate domain (D-) alternatives 
and (ii) select for the implicature freezing operator. The latter is a device that prevents the 
implicature (induced according to general Gricean principles) from being removed (when 
things go wrong). Where the items in (62) differ is (i) in the size of the domain alternatives 
(MIN/MAX)  and  (ii)  the  variant  of  implicature  freezing  operator  selected.  MAX- 
alternatives are “large” domains (expressing our agreement on core cases and doubts about 
marginal  cases).  Selection  of  MAX  alternatives  triggers  an  even  implicature.  Such  an 
implicature can be sustained only in DE environments (in non DE environments it results in 
contradiction). MIN-alternatives include all possible domains, down to the smallest ones, 
thereby  indicating  a  more  radical  uncertainty.  This  results  in  a  different  implicature, 
antiexhaustiveness. Such an implicature, added to the assertion, precipitates a universal 
reading.  Finally,  implicature  freezing  can  come  about  in  two  ways:  with/without  the 
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 : a strong (presuppositional) one and a weak (presupposition free) one. Lexical items 
freely select (through agreement) either variant. As readers can check by themselves, if an 
item triggers even implicature, the presupposition of  ’s can never be met; hence pure 
NPIs  can  only  select  for  presuppositionless   .  If  an  item  selects  for  MIN  alternatives, 
thereby triggering antiexhaustiveness, there are, instead, two possibilities, depending on 
what type of freeze is selected. If one goes for the “weak” option, we get a “double dealer” 
behavior: NPI like in negative contexts, FC in positive contexts. If an item goes for the 
“strong” freeze, one gets a pure FC behavior.  
  So it seems that sistematicity raises, perhaps, its noble head. But several problems 
remain  outstanding.  In  particular,  recall  that  under  certain  type  of  modalities  (e.g. 
imperatives) the “universal” force of any seems to vanish: Push any button! Moreover, 
there is a whole class of FCIs for which a universal interpretation is out of the question 
(German Irgendein, Italian uno qualunque). What about them? 
 
6. Existential readings strike back. 
  In the present section, I deal with existential FCIs. The main idea to be developed 
draws even more directly from Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) than the one discussed in 
sec. 5. (But only after having presented it, I will be able to discuss how exactly the present 
proposal relates to theirs.) 
6.1. Combined effects of FC and indefinite morphology. 
  Besides  the  different  quantificational  force,  a further  characteristic  of  existential 
FCIs, noted in the introduction, is that their marginality in episodic contexts cannot be 
rescued by subtrigging: 
(63)  a. ??Ieri ne ho discusso con un qualunque filosofo (che fosse disposto ad ascoltarmi) 
     Yesterday (I) of-it discussed with a philosopher whatever (that wanted to listen) 
b. Ieri ne ho discusso con qualunque filosofo che fosse disposto ad ascoltarmi 
     Yesterday (I) of-it discussed with whatever philosopher (that wanted to listen) 
c. Avrei dovuto discuterne con un qualunque filosofo  
    (I) should have discussed of-it with a philosopher whatever 
Out of the blue, (63a) is marginal, and the relative clause, if anything, makes things worse, 
in contrast with what happens with universal FCIs (cf. (63b)). An overt modality can rescue 
existential FCIs (as in (63c)). In fact, a way to rescue a non overtly modalized existential 
FCI, like (63a), is embedding/(imagining it embedded) in a context broadly construable as 
modal. The generalization that emerges is that existential FCI are ungrammatical in absence 
of a modal of some sort, modal which sometimes can be covertly supplied (perhaps in the 
form of an assertoric modality – cf. on this also Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). 
  This generalization could be directly built into the grammar of existential FCIs (as K&S, in 
fact, do). We could simply state that an existential FCI must occur in the scope of a modal. 
But it would be more interesting if this link to modalities was derivable from what we have 
found out so far about FC in general and some other property of existential FCIs. 
  An  even  superficial  look  at  the  form  of  existential  FCIs  reveals  that  they  are 
composed out of the FC morphology (irgend in German, qualunque/qualsiasi in Italian) 
plus overt indefinite morphology (ein in German, any numeral in Italian). In the best of all 
possible worlds, the behavior of existential FC should follow from the grammar of FC 
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contribution of overt indefinite morphology. The latter, typically, contributes two things: (i) 
existentiality and, importantly, (ii) an “exactly” implicature: 
(63)  A man walked in 
  i. Interpretation:  x[man(x)   walked in (x)] 
  ii. (Scalar) Implicature:  ¬ twoD (man)  x [ x walk in] 
The existentially closed semantics in (63.i) is already part of the semantics of universal FC; 
so that cannot be what is specific to existential FCIs. Which leaves us with the Scalar 
Implicature (63ii). That must be, then, the culprit. Implausible as this may prima facie 
appear, it seems to follow that existential FC items must be characterized by three things: 
(i)  existentiality,  (ii)  an  antiexhaustiveness  implicature  over  domains  and  (iii)  a  scalar 
(uniqueness) implicature. These three properties jointly should suffice to explaining the 
special relation of existential FCIs to modals and the other differences from universal FCIs. 
As we shall see, this is nearly on the mark. 
To make things concrete, let us consider a hypothetical example. (I assume that the 
indefinite article has roughly the same semantics as the first numeral one and competes 
therefore with numerals and write [ nx…] for “there are at least n x’s…”). 
(64)  a. ?? Ho sposato un qualsiasi dottore  
      (I) married a doctor whatsoever. 
  b. Basic assertion:  1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ) 
  c. Alternatives: 
{ 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ),   2x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ),… 
         1x D
i
w w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ),   2x  D
i
w  w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ),  
        … } 
The basic meaning of an existential FCI like (64a) is identical to that of its universal FC 
counterpart, namely (64b). The alternatives, however, are different: an existential FCI is 
also a scalar term, so its alternatives will contain both scalar (rows) and domain alternatives 
(columns),  as  shown  in  (64c).  These  alternatives  must  be  used  up  through  appropriate 
forms of enrichment (so that the requirement that FC morphology be checked by    can be 
duly met). Accordingly, the scalar alternatives must use O, the D-alternatives must use O
-
. 
The result is shown in (65). 
(65) a. ||  ho sposato un dottore qualsiasi|| =  O
-
(O( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ))) 
    b. O
-
( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ) ¬ 2x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) 
    c. O
-
( !1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) 
    d.    !1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x)   
 D’ [ !1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x)    !1x D-D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   I  
marryw x)]  
In (65b-d) I show the relevant steps of the computation.
27 We first work out the innermost 
parenthesis in (65b) (in (65c), I abbreviate [ 1x…  ¬ 2x…] as [ !1x…], i.e. ‘there is 
                                      
27 It should be noticed that reversing the scope of O and O
-
 leaves things unchanged. Cf. appendix 
VI, for a proof.  
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exactly one x’). Then, we work out the outermost operator in (65d). Now, if our alternative 
domains contain more than one doctor (which they surely will, for otherwise there would 
not be any D-alternative), then (65d) is inconsistent for it says that the sentence I marry 
exactly one doctor must be true of every doctor. This seems to provide us with an account 
of  why  existential  FCIs  in  plain  episodic  contexts  are  marginal  (and  not  rescuable  by 
subtrigging): the two implicatures jointly result in a contradiction. 
  But now let contrast this with what happens in a modal context. Embed (65a) under 
an (overt) modal and compute its interpretation. 
(66)  a. Posso sposare un qualsiasi dottore  
      (I) can marry a doctor whatsoever. 
  b. Basic meaning:  
     w R(w0,w)[ 1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x)] 
    ‘there is an accessible world w, in which I marry a doctor’ 
Towards the computation of the relevant implicatures, notice that (66a) contains two scalar 
terms (a and can), plus the FC morpheme. The computation of the scalar implicatures takes 
place according to the general principles laid out in sec. 3. For simplicity, I will ignore the 
outermost scalar item (i.e. the modal) and focus on the embedded one. Since enrichment 
applies freely at scope sites, we have the following options:
28 
(67)  a.  w R(w0,w)[ O
-
(O(  1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x))] 
b. O
-
( w R(w0,w)[ O(  1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x))]) 
So, it now becomes possible to apply antiexhaustiveness after the modal has been added. 
We know from (65) that (67a) is inconsistent. But let us see what happens with (67b). Here 
are the relevant computations: 
(68)  a. O
-
( w R(w0,w)[ O(  1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x))]) 
b.  w R(w0,w)[  !1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x)]   
      D’[ w R(w0,w)[  !1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x)]       
It is not hard to see that (68b) is consistent. First, the assertion says that there is some 
accessible world w, in which something in D is a doctor I marry (and there are no two such 
things). Second, antiexhaustiveness says, that for every subdomain D’ of D containing a 
doctor, the is a world in which I marry him. We obtain, in other words, a distribution of 
doctors across worlds: any possible doctor constitutes an option for me to marry. Here is 
the picture: 
    Worlds      Doctors I marry 
        w1        d1 
        w2        d2 
                                      
28 Other a priori conceivable combinations are ruled out by various aspects of the algorithm  
presented in section 3. In particular,  
(a) O
-
(O(  w R(w0,w)[  1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x))])) 
is ruled out because the alternatives associated with a have to be handled before the alternatives 
associated with can come into play. This, plus the observation in fn 27, appendix VI leaves those 
in (70) as the only options. 
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     ……… 
       wn        dn 
    ………. 
I.e. the doctors must distribute over the worlds in such a way that in each world I marry a 
different one, so that all the possible doctors are the chosen one in some world or other. 
  This  is  a  neat  result.  The  interaction  of  modalities  and  the  FC  implicature 
(antiexaustiveness) yields without any stipulation whatsoever the right kind of meaning. 
For (66a) plus its implicatures says that I must marry one doctor, and any conveivable 
doctor is a possible option. This is, in essence, the insight of K&S. What we add to this is 
that we don’t have to worry about stipulating that existential FC must occur in the scope of 
a modal. For if there is no modal around, a sentence with an existential FC is unusable.
29 
 
6.2. Intervention: Reprise. 
We reached the conclusion that in non modal contexts existential FC give raise to 
contradictory  implicatures,  rescuable  by  the  insertion  of  a  modal.  However,  potentially 
there  is  another  way  to  rescue  existential  FCIs,  namely  by  inserting  a  quantified  DP 
between the implicature freezing operator and the FCI: 
(1)  a. (??) un linguista ha sposato un qualunque dottore 
           a linguist married a doctor whatever 
b.    [un linguistai [ un qualunque dottorej [ti ha sposato tj]]] 
c.   D’[ y linguistw (y)     !1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   y marryw x)]  
d.  For every doctor a, some linguist marries a and only a 
It  is  not  hard  to  see  that  (1c)  is  not  contradictory  (as  the  informal  paraphrase  in  (1d) 
illustrates). So, if nothing is added, we would be predicting that sentences like (1a) are 
grammatical, which isn’t correct. Only modals can do the job.
30 
  The  observation  in  (1)  suggests  that  we  have  to  stipulate  that  no  other  DP  can 
intervene  between     and  the  DP     associates  with  (i.e.  the  DP  whose  alternatives    
operates on). A modal in the same position is just fine:  
(2)  a. puoi sposare un qualunque dottore 
b.    [can [ a doctorj [proi marry tj]]] 
c.   D’[ w R(w0,w)[  !1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   you marryw x)] 
Even though this is a stipulation, it has a form familiar from much work on locality: it looks 
like,  yet  again,  a  minimality  effect.  The  relation  between     and  its  associated  DP  is 
disturbed by the intervention of another, somehow dishomogeneous DP. Modals, we may 
be tempted to conclude, do not give rise to such an effect because they are “sufficiently 
different” from DPs, to use Rizzi’z (xx) intuition. 
  It is worth to relate this idea to what we have said about NPI-intervention. Consider 
abstractly a typical intervention structure. It has the following form: 
(3)  Op …. YP[-  ]…..XP[+  ] 
We have some category XP with morphology   in a syntactic relation with an operator Op 
and some YP, carrying some feature incompatible with [+  ], on the path of the relation 
                                      
29 The same applies to universal modals. Cf. appendix V for a worked out example 
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creates  an  obstacle.  Our  variant  on  proposals  of  this  sort  for  NPI  intervention  goes  as 
follows. 
(4)  a. ? I never saw every rich man help anybody  
b. I   never saw every[+ ] rich man help anybody[+ ] 
c. * I   never saw every[- ] rich man help anybody[+ ] 
The LF in (5b) is syntactically well formed. However, the feature [+ ] on scalar NPs has 
semantic consequences: it makes the scalar alternatives active. This, according to general 
principles of implicature projection gives rise to a contradiction. Whence the deviance of 
(5b). The variant of every with [-  ] does not have active alternatives and would not yield, 
therefore, any semantic problem. But a structure like (5c) is syntactically ill formed. 
It is tempting to generalize this idea a bit. For one thing, what we are marking as 
[+ ] should be though of as a piece of morphology (that gets mapped onto  ); and, second, 
the semantic consequences of such morphology might be more extensive. In particular, it 
seems  plausible  to  conjecture  that  the  relevant  morphological  features  (say,  NPI-
morphology) induce their canonical effect (D-widening) on any suitable DPs they associate 
with. Let me elaborate on this a bit. Contrast (5) with (6).  
(5)  a. I never saw a rich man help any body  
b. I   never saw a[+ ] rich man help anybody[+ ] 
Weak scalars do not generate interpretive problems in general. Moreover, indefinite DPs, 
like  a  in  (6),  are  the  kind  of  entities  that  can  in  principle  carry  negative  polarity 
morphology. So, syntax requires that they do (think of [+ ] as whatever characterizes NPIs 
morphologically). But then such morphology has its usual  semantic effects, namely, in 
example (6), it induces DW on a rich man. In other words, for all purposes (syntactic and 
semantic) such DP becomes an NPI (i.e. triggers domain extension). This seems intuitively 
right:  indefinites  in  structures  like (6)  do feel  NPI-like. For  example,  we feel  strongly 
tempted,  in  cases  of  this  sort,  to  insert  overt  negative  polarity  morphology  (like  the 
minimizer single in (6b)). Another way to put it is to say that we can interpret (6a) to the 
extent that we insert something like a null minimizer in the intervening DP. 
  Let us go back now to the FC case. Consider the modal in (2) again. Here, such modal 
removes the interpretive obstacle to the type of domain extension called for by the FC 
morphology. Hence, the sentence becomes semantically coherent and all is well. Contrast 
this with (1), repeated here: 
(6)  a. un linguista ha sposato un qualunque dottore 
b.   [un linguista[+ ]i [ un qualunque[+ ] dottorej [ti ha sposato tj]]] 
c.   D’ D [ !1x Dw w’ linguistw’ (y)     !1x D’w w’(doctorw’(x)   y marryw 
x)]  
d.  For every possible linguist a and every possible doctor b, a married b and it is 
not the case that any other possible linguist married any other possible doctor. 
In the subject position of (7a) we now have an indefinite, which can carry FC morphology. 
Hence, in a structure like (7), it must for syntactic reasons. So we wind up with a structure 
of the sort shown in (7b), which (thinking now of [+ ] as FC morphology) tantamounts to 
the insertion of some sort of null qualunque (just like we did in (6)). But then the FC 
morphology follows its usual course (viz. induce antiexhaustiveness). And combined with 
indefinite  morphology,  this  triggers  an  interpretive  clash:  (7c)  is  contradictory  (on  the                                                                                                                   41 
assumption  that  there  is  more  than  one  possible  doctor/linguist)  as  illustrated  by  its 
informal paraphrase (7d). So we do get here an irresolvable intervention effect. 
  Summing up, if the present approach is on the right track, we would have (i) a reason why 
in plain non modal contexts existential FC are marginal (an implicature clash) (ii) a reason 
why modals remove the interpretive obstacle (distribution over worlds) and (iii) a reason 
why DPs which could in principle also remove the interpretive obstacle fail to do so.
31 Be 
that as it may, even if this turns out to be wrong or not to be the whole story, still I think 
that the facts in (1)-(2) point, at the very least at a descriptive level,  in the direction of a 
minimality effect. 
  
6.3. Further consequences and remarks. 
The idea of a sort of “distribution across worlds” is present in different forms in 
previous work on FC elements. One finds it, for example, in Dayal 1998, Giannakidou 
2001, Saeboe 2001, (with disagreements on the nature of the modality involved). The first 
attempt to “deduce” this effect from Gricean principles is Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), 
of which the present work is a direct development. They, however, do not discuss the 
relation between existential and universal FCIs, nor do they derive the differences among 
them from the presence vs. absence of a scalar implicature. There are other differences as 
well between the present proposal and theirs. Kratzer and Shimoyama adopt an alternative 
semantics.  Here  we  stay  within  the  boundaries  of  a  multidimensional  semantics  (more 
directly along the lines of Rooth’s approach to focus or Krifka’s proposal on NPIs, for 
example). Also, even though I would like to stay as neutral as I possibly can on details of 
implicature projection, the present proposal requires something like implicature freezing 
and,  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is  successful,  provides  evidence  for  it.  The  implicature 
freezing operator bears a family resemblance to Rooth’s (1992)  - operator for focus; and it 
also resembles Fox’s recent “abstract only”. But it has somewhat different properties from 
either of them.  
  One consequence of the present approach is that when an existential FCI is not in 
the scope of an overt modal, if the resulting sentence is somehow acceptable, the presence 
of a covert modal operator has to be assumed. For otherwise, the implicatures associated 
with the indefinite would be inconsistent. So a sentence like (69a) must have a logical form 
like the one in (69b): 
(69)  a. Gianni è uscito di corsa e non sapendo che fare, ha  bussato ad una porta qualsiasi 
       Gianni ran out and not knowing what to do, knocked at a door whatsoever. 
  b.   I    [Gianni knocked at a door] 
                                      
31 I believe that DW on non indefinite DPs is impossible for principled reasons. The  
example of every is quite clear. Widening the domain of every automatically makes the sentence 
stronger: 
(a) For any D, D’ such that DD’, everyD(P)(Q) every D’(P)(Q) (for any P and any Q) 
This means that no implicature could possibly arise. And we would have nothing to get 
system of polarity sensitive items going. We may assume that D-widening morphology on non 
indefinite DPs (e.g. universals) is always deviant. So the intervention effect at hand (semantically 
motivated on indefinites) generalizes to all sot of DPs. 
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The abstract assertoric modal in (69) could be interpreted as something like “it follows 
from what I (the speaker) know that Gianni knocked at a door”; the FC implicature would 
then be “it is consistent with what the speaker knows that any door might have been the one 
knocked at”. This is a first approximation (more work needs to be done on the exact nature 
of the modalities involved). But it looks like a reasonable move. Notice also that universal 
FC  choice  elements  are  not  subject  to  a  similar  requirement.  They  can  be  rescued  by 
subtrigging  (which  doesn’t  do  it  for  existential  FC).  Evidently  a  rescue  strategy  that 
employs overt lexical material (subtrigging) is preferred to one that employs null modals as 
in (69). Null modals must be a last resort. 
  The  present  theory  has  a  further  consequence  or,  if  you  wish,  makes  a  further 
prediction. The implicature associated with FCIs must be in the scope of the implicature 
freezing operator; we saw that such an operator, in fact, comes in two variants a strong 
(presuppositional) one and a weak (non presuppositional) one. The presuppositions of the 
strong one can only be met in a positive context. The presuppositionless version of the 
operator  can  function  both  in  negative  and  in  positive  contexts.  We  should,  therefore, 
expect a difference between existential FCIs parallel to the one found for universal FCIs 
(between any and qualsiasi).  
This indeed seems to be so. Italian and German existential FCIs seem to differ 
precisely along these lines (suggesting that we  are probably dealing with a generalized 
parametric variation between Romance and Germanic). Compare (70a) vs. (70b) 
(70)  a.  Niemand musste irgendjemand einladen      NPI reading/rethorical 
      No one    had to a person whatever invite 
    b. Nessuno è costretto ad invitare una persona qualsiasi  rethorical 
        No one had to invite a person whatever 
Kratzer and Shimoyama point out that the preferred interpretation of sentences like (70a), 
particularly if pronounced without special intonation, is a pure NPI-like reading. A second 
one,  the  rethorical  “not  just  anyone”  reading,  is  also  possible  e.g.  in  presence  of  a 
contrastive intonation of some sort. The Italian counterpart of (70a), namely (70b), only has 
the “not just anyone” reading (and consequently, (70b) requires contrastive intonation or a 
special context of some sort). It doesn’t have the NPI reading. 
This follows under the following assumptions. At LF, the available options for German 
are: 
(71)  German: 
a.  LF 1: nobody    x   MUST someD (person)  y invite (x, y) 
b.  Interpretation:  ¬    MUST  [someD  (person)   y  invite  (x,  y)      D     someD 
(person)  y invite(x, y)]
32 
c.  LF 2:    [nobody    x  MUST someD (person)  y invite (x, y)] 
d.  Interpretation: ¬  MUST [someD (person)  y invite (x, y)] 
  In German implicature freezing can take place at two levels. The first is before the 
negative operator comes in (i.e., in the final structure, the negative operator C-commands 
 ; thus   applies to a positive assertion); the second is after negation (i.e., in the final 
structure,   C-commands negation and thus it applies to a negative assertion). The first 
schematic LF is given in (71a); here we first lock the implicature in and then negate the 
                                      
32  For simplicity, I replace nobody with plain negation                                                                                                                   43 
result. The interpretation is roughly “it is not the case that x must invite somebody and that 
anybody is an option”; a reasonable candidate to the rethorical interpretation. The second 
possibility is given in (71c); in this case the FC implicature is entailed by the assertion. It 
therefore disappears. We thus get an NPI like behaviour.  
  In contrast with this, Italian selects for  . And this is going to be incompatible with 
the LF (71c), because it requires that the implicature lead to proper strengthening. Which 
can only happen if freezing applies to something positive (as in (71b)). Thus Italian only 
has the LF corresponding to (71a) and, under negation, only gets the rethorical reading. 
  We are now also in condition of understanding why even the most universal of the 
FC items, like English any or Italian qualsiasi embedded under certain modals all of sudden 
acquires an existential reading (which, in fact, sometimes emerges as the preferred one): 
(72)  a. Taste any donut 
  b. Assaggia qualsiasi donut 
The  logical  form  of  (72)  will  clearly  contain  the  modal  operator  associated  with  the 
imperative,  whatever  that  may  be.  This  opens  up  the  possibility  of  freezing  the  FC 
implicature either within the scope of the imperative or at the top level (with scope over the 
imperative). Schematically:  
  (73)   a.       you taste any donut   
    b.      you taste any donut  
    c.       you taste any donut   
    d.      you taste any donut       you taste any donut 
In (73a), we first freeze the implicature obtaining a universal reading. Then the imperative 
comes in. The result might be paraphrased as “You must taste every possible donut”, a 
possible (if disfavored) reading for (72a-b). In (73c), first the imperative comes in, then we 
freeze the implicature. The result is fully equivalent to what we usually get with existential 
FCIs (minus the uniqueness implicature). So the paraphrase is “it is necessary that you taste 
a donut and for any particular donut, it is possible for you to taste it”.  
  On  the  whole,  the  pattern  of  existential  vs  universal  readings  of  FCIs  is  rather 
intricate. Yet, it seems it is beginning to yield. 
 
7. Concluding remarks. 
  Our chart of PSIs can be integrated as follows: 
(74)  The system of polarity sensitive items 
   [MAX]: pure NPIs        [mai, ever] 
     [MIN]: NPIs/FC (universal)      [any]  
   [MIN]: pure FC (universal)      [qualsiasi] 
   [MIN, SCAL]: NPIs/FC (existential)    [irgendein]  
   [MIN, SCAL]: pure FC (existential)    [uno/due/tre/…NP qualsiasi] 
Let us go through (74) and thereby summarize our main points. What is common to PSIs of 
the  type  studied  in  this  work  is  that  they  all  involve  domain  widening.  Widening  is 
something you only see by comparison. So, the form widening must take is the activation 
of a series of alternatives, out of which the largest gets selected. I implement this in a 
bidimensional  semantics  in  which  next  to  the  basic  value,  we  compute  a  range  of 
alternatives.  What  such  alternatives  do  is  trigger  implicatures,  according  to  general 
principles. The general point was made by Grice long ago: a conversational move is judged 
against a background of other a priori conceivable moves. Selecting a move over another                                                                                                                   44 
can be very telling. Riding on this, speaker-hearers can enrich communication in highly 
efficient  ways,  an  opportunity  which  is  exploited  constantly  and  systematically.  This, 
however, doesn’t take place just when an utterance is completed, as one might think. It 
happens  throughout  the  computation  of  meaning;  implicatures  can  be  factored  in  a 
recursive, compositional manner.  
  The elements in square brackets in (74) are just a mnemonic for the alternatives 
associated  with  the  relevant  entry.  It  is  part  and  parcel  of  this  general  picture  that 
implicatures are determined by the nature of the alternatives. A lot needs still to be done in 
this domain in order to arrive at general principles (which are not slightly disguised “just 
so” stories) on how implicatures come about. Here is, however, the picture we get at this 
point.  
  If the alternatives form a scale (i.e. a linearly ordered set), then choosing an element 
will naturally indicate that all alternatives which are not entailed are not deemed to hold. 
This resembles closely a null only operator O; I have argued that DE contexts require 
special  care  in  handling  O  (essentially,  O  has  to  be  built  into  each  step  functional 
application involving DE functors). 
  If the alternatives do not form a perfect scale (e.g., they constitute a partially but not 
linearly ordered set), we seem to have at least  two plausible options. Suppose that the 
alternatives are relatively “close” to each other. For example, we are considering possible 
domains of similar size. Then, we ought to choose the one which enables us to make the 
strongest (and hence least likely) statement; accordingly, the hearer, making the usual leap 
of  faith,  will  conclude  that  that  is  indeed  what  is  intended  and  an  “even”  implicature 
naturally comes about. We have formalized this via E. 
  If, on the other hand, we are excluding no alternative of any size, down to the 
smallest  possibility,  then  it  sounds  like  we  are  really  uncertain;  we  ought  to  choose, 
therefore, the assertion that commits us the least, the one that enables us to rule out fewer 
possibilities. From this, the hearer will jump to the conclusion that the speaker is trying to 
rule in most possibilities (and hence the existential statement being made is likely to hold of 
every alternative). This is O
-. 
  The operators O, O
- and E are not syntactically projected; they are only part of the 
semantic computation. However, we must have at Logical Form an implicature freezing 
operator  , syntactically real at least to the same extent as focus operators. Such operator 
(which  assigns  to  a  sentence  the  strongest  implicature  that  can  be  factored  in  without 
contradiction) is necessary to obtain the various readings that scalars can give rise to. In 
particular, it is necessary to get strengthening in the “wrong” spots (i.e. within the scope of 
DE functors). Such an operator is also crucial for polarity sensitive items. It gives us a 
syntactically plausible way to  state the requirement that implicatures triggered by PSIs 
cannot be removed. 
  In fact, there are two plausible ways of freezing the implicature in place. One is 
simply to add it in. In this case, depending on whether we are in a negative context or not, 
we will get proper strengthening or disappearance of the implicature. When it “disappears”, 
the implicature becomes just a vehicle to make potential domain widening visible. The 
second  way  to  freeze  the  implicature,  is  to  insist  on  proper  strengthening  (i.e.  the 
implicature  can  be  frozen  only  if  the  result  asymmetrically  entails  the  unenriched 
assertion). This will us force the freezing to take place only with respect to a sentence 
which is, as it were, non negative. Whence the “positive polarity” flavour of some FCIs (a                                                                                                                   45 
notion that otherwise has no formal status, in so far as the present range of constructions is 
concerned).  
  The system we get, if in many ways preliminary, conjugates formal explicitness 
with conceptual simplicity. Most of the similarities/differences among a fairly extended 
(and perhaps typologically significant) range of PSIs seem to fall into place.  
   
APPENDIX. The Formal Theory. 
          I  am  going  to  sketch  a  formally  explicit  characterization  of  the  notion  of 
“(pragmatically) enriched meaning”, building on Chierchia (2002). Such a characterization 
doesn’t deal with all aspects of pragmatic enrichment. It takes the form of a recursive 
definition that to each well formed LF  , associates its enriched interpretations || ||s. The 
definition of || ||s is done in terms of the standard definition of (unenriched) meaning || ||, 
which I take here for granted and assume provides us with a mapping from LF into TY2 
(viz. a typed language with variables over worlds – Gallin xx). Since enriched meanings 
are, in the general case, more than one, || ||s defines a set; i.e. || ||s is to be thought of as a 
relation, rather than as a function. The notion of enriched interpretation || ||s. exploits, in 
addition to || ||, the set of alternatives for  . In the general case, the set of alternatives is 
defined for each expression  , relative to one of its interpretations p; so we can imagine 
defining  ’s alternatives via a function < ,p>
ALT, where p is an appropriate description 
(using, say, a logical form) of  ’s meaning. However, since the context will generally make 
it clear which of  ’s interpretation is relevant, I’ll abbreviate < ,p>
ALTas || ||s
ALT. || ||s 
and  || ||s
ALT are defined by a simultaneous recursion.  
 
I. Basics. 
Interpretations are represented by formulae of TY2. We assume that every predicate 
of TY2 that represents a natural language predicate carries a world variable. Translations are 
set up in such a way that the world variable of the main predicate is the one abstracted over 
under  embedding  (while  the  world  variable  associated  with  the  argument  can  be 
independently set – cf. Percus 2000). An example is provided in (1a).  
(1)  a. I saw some boy   w x Dw(studentw(x)   saww(I, x)) 
  b.  c. || w x Dw(studentw(x)   saww(I, x))||
c 
Strictly speaking, formulae such as the one in (1a) are short hands for functions over contexts  
of the form given in (1b). So a formula as in (1a) is actually to be understood as a function 
from  
contexts  into  sets  of  worlds.  Contexts  include  assignments  to  indexicals  and  to  domain 
variables.  
Since  quantificational  domains  are  the  aspect  of  context  most  directly  relevant  to  our 
concerns, I  
will  generally  refer  to  (1)  as  functions  from  domains  into  propositions.  I  assume  that 
formulae like  
(1) are used to increment common grounds, understood as sets of worlds (Stalnaker xx).                                                                                                                   46 
Intuitively, two formulae are D(omain)-variants iff they are alphabetic variants with respect 
to some domain variable. Here is a semantic characterization of this notion. 
(2)  D-variance. 
  a. q is a D-variant of p (in symbols D-variant(p,q)), iff  there are some i, j such that for every  
  context c, and every domain D, p(c[i/D]) = q(c[j/D]) 
  b. For any p, we designate as D-variant(p) the set of its D-variants. 
In the representation language, we want to define both unrestricted and restricted (i.e. 
domain and world bound) quantification/abstraction. Let U be the domain of individuals and 
let the set of worlds W be a subset of U. Furthermore, let D be an arbitrary subset of U. For 
any world w, Dw is that subset of D containing all members of U existing in w.   
(3)  a. Unrestricted quantification. 
  i. || x ||
w,g = 1 if for some some u in U ||  ||
w,g[u/x] = 1 
  ii. || x  ||
w,g = 0 if for all u in U || ||
w,g[u/x] = 0 
  undefined, otherwise 
  b. Restricted quantification 
i.    || x Dw  ||
g = 1 if for some u such that u   ||Dw||
g, ||   ||
g[u/x] = 1 
ii.   || x Dw  ||
w,g = 0 if ||Dw||
g    and for all u   ||Dw||
g, ||   ||
w,g[u/x] = 0 
      undefined, otherwise. 
  c. Resticted  -abstraction 
    ||   x Dw . ||
g = h, where for every u U, if || Dw||
g    and u ||Dw ||
g =, then  
h(u) = ||  ||
g[x/u]; otherwise, h(u) is undefined. 
  If  w is a formula whose “main” world variable is w, and R is an accessibility relation, then 
we  
express modalities as follows: 
(4)   Modalities. 
  a.  w’ R(w,w’)    w’  (abbreviated as     w  ) 
b.  w’ R(w,w’)    w’   (abbreviated as   w   ) 
Note that for     w   to be true,    has to be undefined or true in every world accessible to 
w; 
while for    w   to be true,    has to true in some world accessible to w 
   
We now turn a characterization of the structure of the lexical entries to be used in the 
recursive characterization of “strong meaning of  ”, for any expression  . 
 
II. Lexicon. 
We will consider two type of lexical entries that activate alternatives: scalar terms and  
polarity items. Let us start with scalar terms. For each lexical entry, we characterize its 
basic  
meaning || || and its alternatives ALT( ), by simply listing them. Here are some relevant 
examples.  
(1)    ||some [+ ]||
  =  P Q  w some(Pw,Qw) =  P Q  w  x [Pw(x)   Qw(x)] 
ALT(some[+ ]) = ALT(every[+ ]) =… =                                                                                                                   47 
=  { P Q  w some(Pw,Qw), …,  P Q  w every (Pw,Qw)} 
Following  Ionin  and  Matushansky  xx,  I  assume  that  the  basic  type  of  numerals  is 
<<e,t>,<e,t>>. They also have a generalized quantifier version, obtained from the basic 
type via existential closure. Here is a simplified characterization of the basic version of 
numerals. 
(2)  ||one[+ ]||
  =  P x  w [ 1(x)   Pw(x) ] 
ALT(one[+ ]) = ALT(two[+ ]) =… { P x  w [ 1(x)   Pw(x) ],  P x  w [ 2(x)   Pw(x) ],…} 
Here is the generalized quantifier version of numerals. 
(3)   ||one[+ ]||
  =  P Q  w  x [ 1(x)   Pw(x)   Qw(x)] 
ALT(one[+ ]) = ALT(two[+ ]) =…  
= { P Q  w  x [ 1(x)   Pw(x)   Qw(x)],  P Q  w  x [ 2(x)   Pw(x)   Qw(x)], …} 
Let us assume the indefinite article a has the same meaning as one.  
Turning to polarity items, negative polarity any can be treated in a manner analogous to 
one,  
except that it does not impose any cardinality requirement on its argument. It binds the 
world  
variable of its argument and it activates “large” sub-domain alternatives. Here is a possible  
way of ensuring this. 
(4)  a. ||any[+ ] ||
  =  P  x x Dw .  w’ [ Pw’ (x) ] 
  b. ALT(any[+ ]) = {  P  x x D’w .  w’ [ Pw’ (x) ] : D’  D and D’ is large } 
The entry in (a)-(b) has a generalized quantifier variant, obtained via  –closure: 
c. ||any[+ ] ||
  =  P Q  w  x x Dw  w’ [ Pw’(x)   Qw(x)] 
  d. ALT(any[+ ]) = {  P Q  w  x x D’w   w’[ Pw’(x)   Qw(x)] : D’  D and D’ is large } 
Keep  in  mind  that  pure  negative  polarity  any  is  a  fiction.  Any  has,  in  fact,  the  FC 
implicature, so its interpretation is actually more similar to the one of qualunque/qualsiasi 
sketched below (modulo the fact that qualunque requires the stronger version of   ). 
Let us now consider the FCI qualsiasi. Qualsiasi is an NP modifier; it binds the world  
variable of its argument; at the  same time, it activates domain  alternatives. Here is an 
example: 
(5)  a. ||due[+ ] studenti qualsiasi[+ ] || =  Q  w  x x Dw .  w’ [ studentw’ (x)   2(x)    Qw(x)] 
      ‘two student whatever’ 
b. ||studente qualsiasi[+ ] || =  x x Dw .  w’ [ studentw’ (x) ] 
     ‘student whatever’ 
So the phrase student whatever denotes the property of being a possibile student in D. It 
combines with numerals in the usual manner. From this we conclude that the lexical entry 
for qualsiasi might be something like: 
(6)  ||qualsiasi[+ ] ||
  =  P  x x Dw .  w’ [ Pw’ (x) ]  
  ALT(qualsiasi[+ ]) = {  P  x x Dw .  w’ [ Pw’ (x)] : D’   D   D    x  w [ Pw(x)    } 
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For any lexical  entry different from the above,  we assume that the  set of their lexical 
alternatives is  
empty. 
(7)  For any lexical entry   different from the above, ALT( ) =    
 
III. Simultaneous recursive characterization of || ||s  and || ||s
ALT.   
To go on with our definition, we need to define two simple auxiliary notions. The first is a  
generalized operation of application which allows us to apply a set of functions to a set of  
arguments of the appropriate type. It is simply a pointwise generalization of functional  
application: 
(8)  Generalized application: 
If B is a set of functions and   a set of arguments of a type appropriate to the  
functions in B, then: 
    B( ) = {  ( ):      ,       } 
The second auxiliary notion spells out when a set of meaning is (properly) scalar. 
(9)  a. A set of meanings A is scalar iff there is a scale <p1  …   pn>   A (where   = 
asymmetrically entails).  
  b. p   A is scalar in A iff  there is a unique scale S  A, such that p S. If p is scalar in A, 
we designate its scale as Sp(A). 
  c. p, q   A are scale mates in A (in symbols, S-A(p,q)) iff Sp(A) = Sq(A). 
The third auxiliary notion is a version of application that embodies the claim that SIs are 
dealt with cyclically (bottom up) and locally: 
Finally, I am also going to adopt the following abbreviations: 
(10)  a. OC (p) = p    q [C(q)    q   p    q]   
  b. EC(p) = p     q [C(q)   p   q] 
  c. O
-
C (p) = p     q C[q   q
-
 ] 
Throughout, || ||s and || ||s
ALT are the smallest sets of semantic values of the appropriate 
type that satisfy the following conditions that follow.  
(11)  Base. 
  If is   lexical entry, then 
11s. || ||s = {|| ||} 
11ALT. || ||s
ALT =  ALT( ), if    ,  || ||s , otherwise  
(12)  Functional Application.  
|| ||s (|| ||s), if   is not DE  
12s.  ||[    ]||s
 =   || ||s (|| ||), if || || is DE and   contains no scalar term 
OC || ||s (|| ||), where C = S|| ||(|| ||)  (|| ||(|| ||
ALT)) , otherwise 
     APPLY(| ||s , || ||s), if || || is not DE  
12ALT. ||[    ]||s
ALT =                                                                                                                    49 
{ OC(  ): where for some     ||[    ]||s , OC ( ) is a D-variant of 
  and C = S (||[    ]||s
ALT), otherwise 
 
(13)  Scalar enrichment 
  If || || is of type t, then: 
13s. || ||s     {OC ( ) :       || ||s , C = S (|| ||
ALT)}  
13ALT. || ||s
ALT=  { OC (  ): where for some     || ||s , OC ( ) is a D-variant of   and C= 
S (|| ||s
ALT) } 
(14)  Max Domain enrichment 
  If || || is of type t and || ||s
ALT doesn’t contain small domains, then:   
  14s. || ||s   {EC ( ) :     || ||s C = || ||s
ALT   D-variant( )} 
14ALT. || ||s
ALT = { EC (  ) :  for  some     || ||s ,     S (|| ||s
ALT ) and C = || ||s
ALT   D-
variant( )} 
(15)  Min Domain enrichment. 
if || ||
ALT doesn’t contain “small” domains;  
  15s. || ||s   { O
-
C( ) :     || ||s , C = || ||s
ALT   D-variant( ) }  
15ALT. || ||s
ALT = { O
-
C(  ) : for  some     || ||s      S (|| ||s
ALT ) and  
C = || ||s
ALT   D-variant( ) } 
 
  Here is the definition of the  –operator in its two forms. 
(16)   a. ||   || =  p[p  || ||s    q [|| ||s(q)   p q]   p      ]  
  a’. ||   ||s
ALT = { p[p  || ||s    q [|| ||s(q)   p q]   p      ] } 
  b. ||   || =  p[p  || ||s    q [|| ||s(q)   p q]   p      ]  
 
 
IV. Examples. MISSING 
V. Gianni deve sposare un dottore qualsiasi ‘ John must marry a doctor whatever’ 
VI. Proof that O (O
-
 ( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ))) is incoherent 
 
O
-
( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) =  D( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x 
)) 
ALT(O
-
( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ))) = 
{ O
-
( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) , …, O
-
( nx Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw 
x )) ,…} 
But for n > 1, O
-
( nx Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) =                                                                                                                     50 
This is so because O
-
( nx Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x )) requires that for every D 
containing a possible doctor, there must be n doctors, which is contradictory. 
So (a) becomes { , O
-
( 1x Dw w’(doctorw’(x)   I marryw x ))}  
This is not a set of alternatives that any of the standard operations can apply to; accordingly 
it will be impossible to empty it.  
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